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The aim of this dissertation is to show that a self-aggrandising British national narrative of the 
Holocaust was established in 1945, developed throughout the twentieth century and persists in 
present day commemorative and pedagogical activity. This is not only in spite of the apparent 
transnationalisation of Holocaust memory since the early 2000s, but has more recently been an 
explicit rejection of Europeanised memory projects, reflecting the political split from Europe 
in the 2016 Brexit referendum. In the literature review, I outline the relevant material that has 
been developed in the field of history and memory studies, as well as key analytical approaches 
to studying memorials, museums and education. Section I then addresses the unique trajectory 
of British Holocaust engagement, supplementing existing research using the memory theories 
of prosthetic memory1, multidirectional memory2 and political memory3, as well as Prosono’s 
distinction between metaphysical and historical memory.4 Having established the significant 
changes in public and political understandings of the Nazi genocide, this dissertation then 
addresses the role of the Holocaust within 21st century policymaking internationally. A 
confrontation of the Europeanised narrative of the Holocaust set forth during the 2000 
Stockholm International Forum and resultant Stockholm Declaration with post-Brexit, 
commemorative activity shows that the Holocaust has remained a central tenet of explicitly 
national identity-building. The case studies that form the basis of this analysis include the 
permanent Holocaust Exhibition at the Imperial War Museum, Holocaust Memorial Day events 
in 2005 and 2016 and the proposed UK Holocaust Memorial and its supporting documents. 
From this analysis, it is evident that a narrative of the Nazi genocide that casts past and present 
British national structures and identities in a positive light not only dominated throughout the 
twentieth century, but continues to exist in post-2000 memory work. Furthermore, this 
narrative has come to the forefront in the 2010s, reflecting the state’s rejection of the European 
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In this thesis, I argue that a specifically British, positive memory narrative of the Holocaust 
was established in 1945 and has developed throughout the remainder of the twentieth century. 
I contend that this nationally oriented memory narrative has persisted in twenty-first century 
Holocaust commemorative activity in spite of the apparent transnationalisation of Holocaust 
memory supposedly triggered by multinational remembrance initiatives at the turn of the 
century. The project builds on the extensive research previously conducted into British 
responses to the Jewish refugee crisis during and in the immediate aftermath of the Second 
World War. Such work has highlighted the emergence of a myth that places Britain the heroic 
nation in the face of Nazism and fails to fully represent that national experience of the 
Holocaust. In the first section I take this notion as my starting point, using theoretical concepts 
drawn from memory studies to gain a further insight into how a narrative of the Holocaust has 
formed and been developed that casts Britain in a favourable light.   
The memory theories that are particularly useful to this analysis are Aleida Assmann’s 
“Political Memory”, Alison Landsberg’s “Prosthetic Memory” and Michael Rothberg’s 
“Multidirectional Memory”. I consider the interactions between these memory forms in three 
key moments of British engagement with the Nazi genocide: the reports of the liberation of 
Bergen-Belsen; the development of a cultural understanding of the Holocaust from the 1960s 
to the 1980s; and the rapid growth of political interest in Holocaust commemoration and 
education in the 1990s. Analysing these key moments using a memory studies framework helps 
to account for the ways in which a particular memory of the Holocaust has developed and 
eventually come to form a cornerstone of British national identity since 1945.  
Having discussed the unique trajectory of British engagement with the Holocaust and 
some of the processes by which the national memory was formed, in the second section I 
consider the impact that this particular narrative has had on twenty-first century 
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commemorative activity. After the millennium, representing, researching and teaching about 
the Holocaust was increasingly viewed as a matter for international co-operation as opposed to 
being the remit of individual nations. The creation of multinational remembrance organisations 
and agreements, such as the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) and the 
Stockholm Declaration, has been commonly interpreted as a sign that Holocaust memory itself 
has ceased to be confined to national boundaries. More recent studies have, however, 
challenged the perception of the Holocaust as a universally understood event, suggesting that 
while outwardly countries may appear to contribute to globalised narratives, there is often an 
implicit adherence to national political needs and priorities.  
I explore this critique of globalised Holocaust memory further with particular reference 
to the fluctuations in British understandings of the Nazi genocide during the twenty-first 
century. I analyse the ways in which the representation of the Holocaust has transformed in 
line with the political shift marked by the 2016 Brexit referendum in relation to a host of 
pedagogical and remembrance projects, including Holocaust Memorial Day (HMD), the 
Imperial War Museum’s (IWM) permanent Holocaust Exhibition, and the plans for a new UK 
Holocaust Memorial and Learning Centre (UKHMLC). There is a clear departure from the 
narrative of the Holocaust purveyed in the 2000 Stockholm Declaration in more recent 
commemorative projects. This indicates that the positive national self-understanding 
developed and consolidated throughout the twentieth century has not only persisted in spite of 
twenty-first century Europeanising projects, but is now a central plank of British Holocaust 






This project fits within the subjects of history, memory studies and research into formal and 
informal Holocaust pedagogy. It also explores the intersections between these three areas, for 
example considering the ways that dominant memory narratives may conflict with historical 
realities. Here I present the key texts that have had an impact on: historical studies of the 
Holocaust; approaches to Holocaust representation; existing literature on memory; critical 
interpretations of transnational understandings of memory. I also introduce the case studies that 
will form the basis of my analysis of present-day British Holocaust representation.  
 
Historical Studies of the Holocaust 
Britain’s experience of the Holocaust has been subject to much scrutiny since the 1990s. One 
of the most influential studies of Britain’s response to the plight of Jews attempting to escape 
persecution in Nazi-occupied Europe is Tony Kushner’s The Holocaust and the Liberal 
Imagination (1993). In this work, Kushner counters previous discussions of Britain’s role in 
the war which tended to land at one of two extremes; while some presented an unambiguously 
positive narrative of British heroism, others argued that Britain’s reluctance to prioritise rescue 
attempts was tantamount to collaboration with the Nazis.5 Instead, Kushner contends that 
British policymaking and popular responses to reports of state-organised antisemitic violence 
in Europe was informed by an adherence to liberal ideological values. The prevalence of this 
ideology limited Britons’ capacity to truly comprehend the extent of Nazi violence as the 
epitome of illiberal phenomena6. Not only that, but the idea of individual freedom conflicted 
with the nature of Jewish cultural identity, meaning that there was widespread, antisemitic 
																																																						
5 Tony Kushner, The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
1993), p.1. 
6 Ibid, p.18. 
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suspicion of Jewish communities even when there was sympathy for their plight at the hand of 
the Nazis.7 Yet conversely, one of the British Government’s main concerns that prevented the 
admittance of greater numbers of refugees in the 1930s was that a higher Jewish population in 
Britain would foster domestic antisemitism, which again conflicts with concepts of equality. It 
was not only antisemitism that prevented greater numbers of Jews from being allowed entry 
into Britain, then, but ironically, also the fear of antisemitism. With this ideological explanation 
established, Kushner presents a more nuanced picture of Britain’s response to and experience 
of the Holocaust, rationalising instances when the government failed to act whilst also 
highlighting the role of individual activists, in particular Eleanor Rathbone, and independent 
organisations in helping Jewish refugees.  
A similarly even-handed approach is taken by Louise London in her book Whitehall 
and the Jews 1933-1948: British Immigration Policy and the Holocaust (2000). London’s 
investigations into British policymaking and public responses to the Nazi genocide highlight 
instances of genuine humanitarian concern on the part of the British public and government, 
but also give due attention to instances where national political and economic priorities or 
antisemitic stereotypes meant that the government withheld support. She also emphasises the 
fact that official policies were not always adhered to by officials, and that there were some 
people who campaigned throughout the war for more compassion to be shown to Jewish 
refugees. Overall, London finds that the British wartime government’s response to Jews fleeing 
Nazism was characterised by self-preserving policymaking and an effort to avoid taking 
responsibility for the refugee crisis. For example, following the ferocious attacks on Jews in 
1938 during Kristallnacht and following the Anschluss with Austria, visa requirements were 
reintroduced, enabling only “desirable” refugees to be granted entry to Britain.8 Those hoping 
																																																						
7 Ibid, p.272. 
8 Louise London, Whitehall and the Jews, 1933-1948: British Immigration Policy and the 
Holocaust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.63.  
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to escape Nazi-occupied Europe had to prove that they could contribute to the British economy 
without worsening existing issues of unemployment; that they would not be a financial burden 
on the state; and that they only planned to stay in Britain on a temporary basis.9 This mostly 
meant either working as domestic servants, or receiving financial support from the Anglo-
Jewish community, refugee organisations or family members already living in Britain. On top 
of this, Jews who were able to assimilate within British culture were given preferential 
treatment, hence the government’s agreement to initiatives such as the Kindertransport, during 
which 10,000 unaccompanied Jewish children were allowed entry.  
Ultimately, London concludes that although Britain did undoubtedly miss numerous 
opportunities to intervene or enact rescue missions to save European Jews, ‘the additional lives 
saved would have been numerically marginal.’  However, the minimal difference such 
opportunities would have made to the overall death toll was not behind the British 
government’s failure to act; instead London states that ‘weak though the prospect of saving 
Jewish lives may have been, the will to pursue such risks was significantly weaker’.  As such, 
London follows Kushner’s reasoning that the British wartime government’s failure to intervene 
in the Nazi genocide was generally due to domestic ideological factors, concerns or prejudices 
as opposed to a sense of helplessness in the face of Nazi brutality. 
In addition to the commonalities in their analysis of Britain’s responses and attitudes to 
the Jewish refugee crisis of the 1930s and 1940s, Kushner and London also share the contention 
that a dominant narrative of the Britain and the Holocaust was formed throughout the twentieth 
century that does not accurately represent the national experience of the event. Kushner 
declares that although there is a wealth of information revealing the extent of public and state 
awareness of the Holocaust, Britain and the other western liberal democracies have not been 




mythologised’.10 Similarly, London argues that ‘the British record has been obscured by 
selective memories over Britain’s war-time role. The myth was born that Britain did all it could 
for the Jews between 1933 and 1945’.11 While these studies present historical facts that contrast 
with the dominant national narrative of the Holocaust in Britain, they do not explain the 
processes by which this narrative has been formed and consolidated. 
The volume Britain and the Holocaust: Remembering and Representing War and 
Genocide (2013) provides a helpful starting point for my analysis of the rift between Britain’s 
experience of the Holocaust and the pervasive narratives of national heroism. This work not 
only re-evaluates Britain’s role in the Holocaust, questioning the narrative of unassailable 
national heroism, but it also considers the ways in which this memory was formed and has been 
consolidated from 1945 to the first few years of the twenty-first century. The volume is 
organised in four sections, focusing on the responses to witnesses of the Nazi mass murder 
immediately after the war, the media’s representation of the Holocaust in the twentieth century, 
exhibiting the Holocaust at the Imperial War Museum (IWM), and national Holocaust 
commemoration.12 The contributions to this volume help to account for the formation and 
consolidation of a particular British national memory throughout the twentieth century, and 
explore some of the ways that this narrative has persisted in spite of multinational remembrance 
projects at the turn of the twenty-first century. However, this volume does not account for the 
significant realignment of Holocaust engagement brought about by unprecedented socio-
political shifts in Britain that resulted in and from the 2016 Brexit referendum. I aim to expand 
this discussion using the memory models outlined below to further analyse the development of 
British Holocaust memory in the twentieth century. Through focusing on the ways in which 
																																																						
10 Kushner, p.12. 
11 London, p.13.  
12 Caroline Sharples and Olaf Jensen, Britain and the Holocaust: Remembering and 
Representing War and Genocide, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).  
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this has persisted in national commemorative events, and in formal and informal pedagogical 
institutions following the break from the EU signalled by Brexit, I argue that British Holocaust 
consciousness in the twenty-first century continues follow an existing tradition of prioritising 
a positive national narrative.  
 
Existing Literature on Memory 
Historians’ identification of a rift between Britain’s historical experience of the Nazi genocide 
and its aftermath and the dominant narratives developed throughout the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries can be explained by the theoretical insights of memory studies. Astrid Erll has 
identified three waves of memory studies since the discipline first emerged in the early 
twentieth century.13 The first wave was characterised by an understanding of memory that 
centred on individuals and social groups. The work that triggered the initial engagement with 
memory in social terms was Maurice Halbwachs’ On Collective Memory (1952), which 
popularised the notion that memories can exist externally to the individual. According the 
Halbwachs, an individual’s understanding of events, even those experienced in total isolation, 
is dependent on their interaction with the wider social milieu.14   
Though the concept of collective memory gained some initial traction, it was relatively 
stagnant until the 1980s, when French historian Pierre Nora adopted collective memory as a 
mechanism to study national identity and memory, marking the advent of the second “wave” 
of memory studies.15 Nora expanded on Halbwachs’ concept of collective memory in a 
collection of three volumes titled Les Lieux de Mémoire (1984-1992). He contended that 
																																																						
13 Astrid Erll, "Travelling Memory", Parallax, 17.4 (2011), 4-18 
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13534645.2011.605570>. 
14 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, trans. by Lewis A. Coser, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992), p.84. 
15 Lucy Bond, Stef Craps and Pieter Vermeuelen, "Introduction", in Memory Unbound: 
Tracing the Dynamics of Memory Studies (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2011), p.8. 
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memories can exist in external sites or realms, including monuments and memorials, literature, 
or even individuals that come to represent an event.16 
 The second wave of memory studies has been shaped by a general perception of 
memory that typically follows a national paradigm. Aleida Assmann has explored the 
formation and development of Holocaust memory with reference to her four formats of 
memory: political memory, social memory, cultural memory and individual memory.17 
Breaking down memory into these four forms enables an analysis of remembrance and 
educational projects, taking into account political motivations as well as social and cultural 
precedents for remembrance. Though Assmann is clear that these concepts can be applied to 
any national context, the work can nonetheless be considered part of the second wave of 
memory studies because of her assumption that these memory forms will ultimately operate 
within national boundaries. 
Assmann’s term “political memory”, which refers to the memory transmitted through 
state organisations and initiatives, is particularly useful for my discussion of British Holocaust 
memory. It is homogeneous and institutionalised, presenting a top-down narrative of the past 
that serves political needs.18 National institutions, policymaking and annual events provide an 
opportunity for nations to ‘transform certain historical myths by dictating the ways in which 
they are processed, interpreted and appropriated’.19 This statement quite clearly links to 
London’s and Kushner’s contention that a mythical narrative of British wartime actions has 
evolved since the end of World War Two. 
																																																						
16 Pierre Nora, "Pierre Nora: from Between Memory and History: Les Lieux De Mémoire", 
trans. by Marc Roudebush, in Theories of Memory: A Reader (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2007), p.146. 
17 Aleida Assmann, Shadows of Trauma: Memory and the Politics of Postwar Identity, trans. 
by Sarah Clift (New York: Fordham University Press, 2016), pp.19-23. 
18 Ibid, p. 23. 
19 Ibid, p.25. 
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Though the Holocaust is undoubtedly central to German national identity and memory 
culture, it has increasingly come to be seen as a transnational event with transnational 
implications. The development of multinational Holocaust remembrance initiatives in the early 
2000s can be understood as the catalyst for this shift towards the transnational considerations 
of memory, marking the advent of a third wave of memory studies. Perhaps the most influential 
memory theory of this period was Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider’s “cosmopolitan 
memory”.20 This term refers to a memory form that emerges at the interface between local and 
global memories, and ‘involves a tension between national memories and memories that 
emerge from a global context to permeate that national framework without nullifying it’.21  In 
this process, a memory of past events can be integrated into ostensibly unrelated contexts, 
enabling local memories to be interpreted through a global frame of reference. By Levy and 
Sznaider’s reasoning, a cosmopolitan memory of the Holocaust has been developed that acts 
as a ‘touchstone for a disorientated, de-territorialised humanity searching for moral clarity amid 
constant uncertainty’.22 
A second pivotal text belonging to the third wave of memory studies is Michael 
Rothberg’s Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of 
Decolonisation (2009). Building on Levy and Sznaider’s analysis, Rothberg presents the 
capacity for Holocaust remembrance to facilitate the articulation of other traumatic or 
problematic pasts. He asserts that memory is ‘subject to ongoing negotiation, cross-referencing 
and borrowing’23, allowing the memory of the Holocaust to become a reference point in 
seemingly unrelated debates. This is an insightful analytical approach, as it enables both the 
																																																						
20 Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, Cosmopolitan Memory: The Holocaust and Memory in 
the Global Age, trans. by Assenka Oksiloff (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006). 
21 Ibid, p.131. 
22 Ibid, p.24. 
23 Michael Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 
p.22. 
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existing precedent for narratives of the Holocaust and the contemporary socio-political context 
to be taken into account.  
The realignment of the field of memory studies from the national to the transnational is 
outlined in the volume Memory Unbound: Tracing the Dynamics of Memory Studies (2017), 
edited by Lucy Bond, Stef Craps and Pieter Vermeuelen. This work charts the transition of 
conceptualisations of memory from being tied to particular social groups and locations, to 
being untethered and able to move through different physical forms and national contexts. They 
organise memory theories into the categories of ‘transcultural, transgenerational, transmedial 
and transdisciplinary drifts’.24 The transmedial movement of memory is a central notion to 
Alison Landsberg’s theory of “prosthetic memory”. In Prosthetic Memory: The 
Transformation of American Remembrance in the Age of Mass Culture (2004), Landsberg 
argues that engagement with past traumatic events through immersive mass media, in particular 
television and films, enables individuals to take on a “prosthetic memory” of the event, altering 
‘political outlooks and affiliations and also motivat[ing] political action’.25 Prosthetic memory 
can thus help to shed further light on the ways in which British audiences were subconsciously 
directed towards particular political narratives of the Holocaust at the end of the Second World 
War.  
As well as contributing to an analysis of turning points in Britain’s memory of the 
Holocaust independently, it is also interesting to see how these memory forms have 
intertwined. For example, political memory can be used to address the intentions behind reports 
of concentration camps at the end of the war, while prosthetic memory can explain the way in 
which this was mediated to the public and integrated into individuals’ sense of self. Similarly, 
what may appear to be a multidirectional memory, such as the representation of subsequent 
																																																						
24 Bond, p.5. 
25 Alison Landsberg, Prosthetic Memory: The Transformation of American Remembrance in 
the Age of Mass Culture (Colombia University Press, 2004), p.24. 
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genocides during Holocaust memorial events, can be ultimately understood in terms of political 
memory. By addressing the intersection between these memory forms, I am able to add a new 
dimension to existing discussions of British Holocaust memory, and consider the reasons why 
it has been made a central feature of British national and political discourse in the twenty-first 
century.  
 
Critical interpretation of transnational understandings of memory 
The dominant trend in “Third Wave” memory studies, that of viewing memory as beyond 
physical, national boundaries has more recently been called into question. Larissa Allwork has 
put forward three key criticisms of Levy and Sznaider’s “New Cosmopolitan” reading of the 
IHRA and the SIF: first, recent research has revealed far more Jewish remembrance of the 
Holocaust in the immediate post-war period than accounted for by Levy and Sznaider; second 
the role of institutions such as the EU and the UN in the IHRA and the SIF as well as 1990s 
restitutions movements was far more complex than previously assumed; and third the 
weaknesses of existing international organisations in the face of contemporary genocides is 
underplayed.26 Her analysis highlights the importance of ensuring that current projects are 
anchored in practical measures to confront societal injustices rather than being restricted to 
rhetoric or performative acts of engagement with the past.  
The potential co-existence of two narratives of the Holocaust – one that reflects 
“cosmopolitan values” and one that responds to particular national political needs27 – is further 
demonstrated by Stefan Van der Poel’s analysis of the “memory crisis” that has emerged 
between Western and Eastern European nations since the integration of the latter into the EU 
																																																						
26 Ibid, p.140. 
27 Stefan Van der Poel, "Memory Crisis: The Shoah Within a Collective European 
Memory", Journal of European Studies, 49.3-4 (2019), 1-15, p.11. 
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in 2004. Though the focus of this article is the divide between Eastern and Western European 
countries’ memory of the Holocaust, his analysis does raise some interesting points that should 
also be considered within the British context. The difficulty of transposing a cosmopolitan 
narrative of the Holocaust onto Eastern European countries’ understanding of the past may be 
considered as an example in extremis of the issues encountered when trying to establish any 
transnational collective memory. 
A similar criticism of the dominant cosmopolitan or transnational reading of the SIF 
has also been explored with particular reference to British remembrance in the first few years 
of the twentieth century in Britain and the Holocaust (2013). For example, Andy Pearce’s 
chapter explores the ways in which post-2000 remembrance projects that ostensibly belong to 
the globalised body of commemorative activity in reality perpetuated longstanding, nationally 
focused tropes. With particular reference to Holocaust Memorial Day (HMD), Pearce shows 
that the ‘transnationalisation of Holocaust memory must still be analysed in the contextual 
framework of individual nation states’.28  
 Allwork’s and Van der Poel’s challenging of the affixation of the term “Cosmopolitan” 
to early twenty-first century remembrance policymaking, and Pearce’s analysis of British 
commemorative activity in the 2000s provides a starting point for discussions of present-day 
British Holocaust memory. Due to the time of their writing or their geographical focus, these 
works did not have the opportunity to consider the impact of significant social and geopolitical 
shifts that have occurred in Western Europe during the 2010s. Of particular relevance in the 
British example is the rising sense of popular and political Euroscepticism that culminated in 
the 2016 Brexit referendum and decision to leave the European Union (EU). In light of this 
																																																						
28 Andy Pearce, 'Britain’s Holocaust Memorial Day: Inculcating “British” or “European” 
Holocaust Consciousness', in Britain and the Holocaust: Remembering and Representing War 
and Genocide, ed. by Caroline Sharples and Olaf Jensen (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2013), p.204. 
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transformation, I contend that this initial focus on British heroism not only did not diminish 
following the global memory initiatives in the early 2000s, but has intensified and become 
more overt as Euroscepticism and isolationist policies have taken firmer hold on British 
political discussions in the 2010s.  
 
Approaches to Holocaust Representation 
The memory theories introduced offer a greater insight into the impact of Holocaust education 
and remembrance on individuals’ identification with national and international communities. 
This insight can be further expanded by taking into account the various methodological 
approaches to representing the Nazi genocide. Explorations into Holocaust pedagogy – whether 
that be in formal educational settings, in national projects or in independent initiatives – have 
drawn out a conflict between the history of the Holocaust, and its perceived capacity to inspire 
change in the future and present world. Debates surrounding how best to represent and discuss 
the Nazi genocide came to a head in the late 1980s in what has come to be known as the 
Historikerstreit. As has been summarised by Ian Kershaw, at the centre of these debates was 
the question of whether it was possible to study the Holocaust using the same historical 
methods as with other events. 29 The Historikerstreit saw a re-evaluation of existing 
engagement with the history of the Holocaust, and disrupted narratives that had tended to result 
in an oversimplified understanding of how Nazism had taken hold in Europe, seeing the period 
isolated from a standard historical chronology.30   
 Nicolas Kinloch built on the arguments first put forward in the Historikerstreit in his 
evaluation of the purpose of teaching the Nazi genocide in British secondary schools. Kinloch 
																																																						
29 Ian Kershaw, Hitler, The Germans, And The Final Solution (London: Yale University 
Press, 2009), pp.286-7. 
30 Ibid. 
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criticises the tendency for the Holocaust to be reduced to abstract moral lessons, leading it to 
function primarily as a ‘piece of crude social engineering’.31 Attempting to impart moral 
lessons via Holocaust education is, according to Kinloch, not only inappropriate, but also 
ineffective, as students’ behaviour will be determined by their own worldview and moral code 
outside of the classroom.32 Instead, he calls for history teachers to prioritise the historical 
realities of the Nazi genocide, teaching students what happened, who it happened to and why. 
It is only when its ‘quasi-mystical associations’33 are removed that teaching about the 
Holocaust in secondary schools is appropriate.   
 The different approaches to Holocaust education first outlined in the Historikerstreit 
and later evaluated by Kinloch have been organised into two categories by social scientist 
Marvin Prosono. Prosono argues that there are two kinds of Holocaust: the “historical 
Holocaust” refers to the specific events between 1933 and 1945, while the “metaphysical 
Holocaust” is concerned with metaphorical representations that position the Holocaust as a 
touchstone of moral identities and debates.34 Whereas the former encourages an assessment 
how the events of the Holocaust have impacted contemporary systems and structures, the latter 
is grounded firmly within questions of individual identity, moral values and behaviours.35 
Prosono’s classification of these two forms of Holocaust engagement shines a light on the 
reasoning behind contemporary engagement with and representations of the Holocaust.   
Prosono’s analysis can be related to discussions of sacrality in Holocaust representation 
that are addressed in Avril Alba’s analysis of memorial sites. Alba outlines the ways in which 
																																																						
31 Nicolas Kinloch, "Learning About the Holocaust: Moral or Historical Question", Teaching 
History, 93, November 1998 (1998), p.45. 
32 Ibid, p.46. 
33 Ibid, p.46.  
34 Marvin Prosono, "The Holocaust as a Sacred Text: Can the Memory of the Holocaust Be 
Tamed and Regularised?", 2001 <https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-1-
349-66019-3_159.pdf> [Accessed 10 June 2019]. 
35 Ibid. 
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symbols of religious sacrality are integrated into secular Holocaust memorial spaces, 
facilitating the development of redemptive, though problematic, narratives of past and present 
national actions.36 Prosono’s distinction between the metaphysical and the historical Holocaust 
is an important addition to such discussions of commemoration as it can help to identify the 
intentions behind public representations of the Holocaust. 
While a historical representation provides the facts of the past and can indicate, to a 
degree, how the Nazi genocide was possible, Kushner’s, London’s and Sharples’ projects have 
all shown that this will not always be a favourable narrative for present day British purposes. 
As such, it is unlikely that a purely historical approach would be found in state-organised 
Holocaust remembrance projects. Conversely, a metaphysical approach to Holocaust 
representation can guide individuals to draw more commendatory conclusions about national 
identities and present-day realities. If this is the ultimate form that Holocaust commemoration 
will take, then it is vital to consider who has determined the “lessons” to be taken from the 
past, and how they will be used to alter perceptions in the present and future. Understanding 
whether the Holocaust is being represented in historical or metaphysical terms is important 
because it can help to uncover the focus of and intentions behind various forms of Holocaust 
remembrance and education.  
 
Case Studies of British Holocaust Commemoration  
The material introduced above provides the historical and theoretical framework on which I 
base my analysis of British engagement with the Holocaust in the twenty-first century in 
Section II. The case studies that make up this analysis include national memorial sites and 
																																																						




museums, pedagogical initiatives and commemorative ceremonies. Firstly, I consider the ways 
that these manifestations of Holocaust memory in twenty-first century Britain continued to 
reflect positively on the national experience of the Holocaust during the 2000s. Then, by 
comparing the narratives in the 2000s to those during the 2010s, I argue that this national focus 
has become all the more explicit in light of shifts in the political landscape signalled by the 
2016 Brexit referendum.  
 There is a significant body of research covering the representation of the Nazi genocide 
within formal educational settings. Kinloch’s aforementioned evaluation of approaches to 
Holocaust education appeared amidst a growing effort amongst educational specialists to 
determine the best way to teach secondary school pupils about the Nazi genocide following the 
introduction of mandatory Holocaust education in the first National Curriculum. Ian Gregory 
has highlighted the symbolic significance of the Holocaust as the epitome of humans’ capacity 
for evil, and calls for the development of Holocaust education that is grounded in historical 
facts that can ‘act as the bedrock’37 for discussions of further acts of discrimination. Similarly, 
Stuart J. Foster and Keith A. Crawford discuss the ways in which curricula emulate societal 
ideologies and concerns, indicating how national identities and values, and international 
political relations and rivalries are inculcated in school textbooks’ representations of the past.38  
The inculcation of formal Holocaust education with the introduction of the National 
Curriculum has long been identified as a turning point for British political Holocaust 
consciousness. Pearce has conducted extensive research into the processes that led to the 
development of compulsory Holocaust education in British secondary schools, and how it has 
been transformed by changes in the national leadership. He argues that the issues in Holocaust 
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education are reflective of the more general shortcomings of Britain’s particular national 
memory of the Holocaust.39 Pearce has also identified a more recent expectation for teaching 
and learning about the Nazi genocide to take on a commemorative role, as an age approaches 
in which there will be no more living Holocaust survivors.40  
 In this thesis, I consider the issues identified in formal Holocaust education in relation 
to a host of informal pedagogical initiatives, including memorials, museums and 
commemorative events. Using the examples of the IWM’s permanent Holocaust exhibition, 
the televised annual HMD commemoration ceremonies, and plans for a new UK Holocaust 
Memorial and Learning Centre (UKHMLC), I am able to determine the impact of British 
political events in the 2010s on manifestations of Holocaust education and remembrance. 
 The dominant metaphysical approach to in-school Holocaust education can also be 
identified in the narratives promoted by museums, such as the IWM. This is certainly not an 
exclusively British phenomenon, but is instead part of an increasing tendency for museums to 
operate within more emotional and moral frameworks. The tendency for museums to take on 
this morally orientated role has been identified by Paul Williams in his study of memorial 
museums from all over the world.  Williams contends that since the early 2000s there has been 
‘an increasing desire to add both a moral framework to the narration of terrible historical events 
and more in-depth contextual explanations to commemorative acts’.41  
 Tom Lawson’s review of the initial iteration of the IWM’s Holocaust exhibition also 
reveals that manifestations of Holocaust education in Britain instituted and developed in the 
2000s continued to promote a positive national narrative that distanced Britons from the horrors 
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of the Holocaust.42 It is worth noting that this review was written prior to the publication of 
Levy and Sznaider’s discussion of cosmopolitan Holocaust memory in the global age. 
Therefore, Lawson does not attempt to locate the development of the site within the broader 
network of Pan-European policymaking, thus enabling the positive national narrative to appear 
all the more clearly.  
Rebecca Jinks has more recently analysed the ways that the contents of the Holocaust 
exhibition interact with and differ from the representation of other contemporary atrocities 
covered in the museum. Jinks reiterates Lawson’s criticism that ‘while the visitors are 
encouraged to draw strong moral lessons, the exhibition does stop short of making explicit the 
implications of the Holocaust for today’s Britain, and the visitors themselves’.43 This indicates 
that the issues first outlined by Lawson have lingered in the decades that followed. Though 
Jinks’ does take into account the institutional shifts in the IWM since 2003, she does not 
consider the impact of increased British Euroscepticism in the last five years. I am able to 
expand upon the issues raised by Jinks and Lawson, contending that the implicit British focus 
they identify has now come to the forefront.   
 The tendency to present British historical actions in a positive light is also identifiable 
in Holocaust Memorial Day (HMD) remembrance ceremonies. Pearce contends that HMD 
2001 ‘can be put forward as a case study par excellence of how the transnationalisation of 
memory must still be analysed in the contextual framework of individual nation states’.44 I 
expand Pearce’s discussion in relation to the ceremonies held prior to Brexit in 2005 and in the 
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midst of Brexit debates in 2016. An analysis of these events, with reference to John E 
Richardson’s four “metafunctions” reinforces Pearce’s contention that ostensibly transnational 
memory work should be considered in terms of its relationship to specific national contexts. 
As well as investigating the changes in existing institutional representations of the Nazi 
genocide in twenty-first century Britain, I also explore the narrative presented in the new UK 
Holocaust Memorial and Learning Centre (UKHMLC) and its supporting document Britain’s 
Promise to Remember (2015). The UKHMLC can be also related to Williams’ analysis of 
memorial sites, and Alba’s discussion of sacrality in memorialising the Holocaust. Through an 
analysis of its organisers’ understanding of the Holocaust’s relevance to the contemporary 
political structures, it becomes clear that the UKHMLC will promote an unambiguously 
positive narrative of British actions in the Second World War, and national responses to 
contemporary crises. It thereby explicitly rejects Europeanising representations of the 
Holocaust, as is particularly evident in the language used in Britain’s Promise to Remember. 
An analysis of the design, location and contents of the UKHMLC as well as its supporting 
documentation reaffirms my argument that British Holocaust memory in the 2010s has seen 
the development of an overtly positive narrative of the Holocaust that contradicts apparent 
efforts to consolidate a collective, Pan-European memory narrative of the Nazi genocide. 
 
Summary 
As the breadth of this literature review suggests, the Holocaust has occupied an increasingly 
large area of academic study since the twentieth century. Exploring the consolidation of a 
national self-perception since 1945 and the ways in which it contrasts with the historical 
realities of Britain’s experience of the Holocaust is important, because it reveals that this 
positive narrative is not a recent phenomenon but has shaped British national identity and 
memory since the end of the Second World War. British engagement with the Nazi past has 
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continued to revolve around this perception of Britain as the heroic nation in the war – a 
perception that has been consolidated through formal and informal education, and in national 
remembrance events during the 2000s. This thesis then argues that the representation of the 
Holocaust in present-day Britain further promotes a positive national narrative, reflecting the 
shift towards isolationist policymaking signalled by the Brexit referendum. The perceptible 
prioritisation of British national needs conflicts with the presentation of Holocaust memory as 
evidence of transnational memory within recent memory theories. Instead, an exploration into 
British memory work reveals that although there may be a rhetorical shift towards the 















Section I: Britain and the Holocaust 1933-1999 
In their research, Kushner and London have both shown that British responses to the Holocaust 
were not, as current political rhetoric might suggest, characterised by empathy and hospitality. 
In the following, I use memory studies theories to explore the ways in which these myths, or 
memory narratives, of Britain as the saviour of Jews from Nazism were established and have 
been consolidated throughout the twentieth century. Firstly, I consider Richard Dimbleby’s 
report of the liberation of Belsen concentration camp as a case study of British engagement 
with the Nazi genocide in 1945. The way this report shaped British understandings of the 
Holocaust has been covered in detail in the volume Belsen in History and Memory (1997) 
edited by Jo Reilly et al. Here, I add a new dimension to their discussion using the theories of 
prosthetic memory and political memory, exploring why the broadcast did not spark critical 
self-reflection in Britain in spite of its significant impact on British audiences. 
 I then discuss the ways in which British Holocaust memory has followed its own unique 
trajectory by contrasting the awakening of a West German Holocaust consciousness in West 
Germany in the 1960s with the general ignorance of the topic in Britain during the same period. 
Rothberg has used his theory of multidirectional memory to account for the emergence of 
active engagement with the history of the Nazi genocide amongst young West Germans in the 
protest movements of the late 1960s. In Britain, however, a similar period of self-reflection did 
not occur. The lack of critical engagement with the national past can be partly explained by the 
popular acceptance of national memory narratives first established at the end of the Second 
World War. A continued adherence to self-aggrandising national narratives is identifiable in 
1980s Britain amid calls from the Anglo-Jewish community for the establishment of a national 
Holocaust memorial. The public and government responses to this proposal reveal that forty 
years after the end of the Second World War, remembering the victims of the Nazi genocide 
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and considering its implications for the present day was still perceived as an exclusively Jewish 
responsibility in Britain.  
Yet, by the early 1990s, the Holocaust had come to be seen as a central political priority, 
exemplified by its inclusion in the first National Curriculum and by the British government’s 
role in instituting multinational remembrance projects. I investigate this transition from a social 
engagement with the Nazi genocide to the formation of a state-determined master narrative 
narrative using Assmann’s political memory. To do so, I use the Holocaust Educational Trust 
(HET)’s Lessons from Auschwitz programme as a case study of 1990s British Holocaust 
education, indicating the ways in which it embodied a political, metaphysical narrative of the 
Nazi past. From this analysis, it is apparent that remembering the Holocaust at a state level was 
taken up in governmental circles in the 1990s as a means to counter increasingly popular critical 
evaluations of wartime and present-day government actions to progress further. Instead, by 
regaining control of the narrative of the Holocaust, the government was able to reinforce 
existing positive national self-perceptions. 
  
 
British engagement with the Holocaust in 1945 
In April 1945, British audiences were shocked by the horrific images and eyewitness accounts 
of suffering inflicted by the Nazis on human beings in Belsen concentration camp.45 Images of 
the camps appeared in newsreel footage, newspaper articles, radio broadcasts and in special 
publications such as the Daily Mail’s book Lest We Forget: The Horror of Nazi Concentration 
Camps Revealed for All Time in the Most Terrible Photographs Ever Published (1945). Initial 
reporting of the Nazis’ crimes has since been criticised for a lack of sensitivity in their handling 
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of the dead; a failure to identify those who had survived as human beings, let along as 
autonomous individuals who existed beyond Nazi oppression; and their reflection of the British 
war effort in a positive light stemming from the positioning of Belsen as the justification for 
involvement in the conflict.46 This representation of liberation ‘gave rise to a single, monolithic 
and heroic narrative embedded in popular memory and official documents’.47 The focus of my 
analysis will be Dimbleby’s account of Belsen concentration camps recorded just a matter of 
days after its liberation. Applying the terms political memory and prosthetic memory to the 
contents and mediation of this report, it is possible to shed further light on the reasons why this 
narrative was constructed, and how it came to form a central pillar of British understanding of 
the Nazi genocide. 
Dimbleby’s harrowing account of what he witnessed when accompanying British 
troops to Belsen shortly after its liberation played an important role in shaping Britons’ 
understanding of the Holocaust at the end of the Second World War. Audiences were shocked 
to hear the description of ‘the world of a nightmare’48 where ‘human beings are herded like 
animals behind barbed wire’.49 In a departure from the typically restrained style of BBC 
reporting at the time, Dimbleby is audibly emotional as he describes a young girl who 
resembled a ‘living skeleton’ whose face ‘was only a yellow parchment sheet with two holes 
in it for eyes’.50 Yet while the aim when recording this report was to relay the extremities of 
Nazi violence against European Jews, it focuses primarily on the experiences of the liberating 
soldiers as opposed to that of the people incarcerated at the camp. For example, Dimbleby 
describes a woman begging a British soldier for milk to give her baby. When the soldier goes 
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to take the child, he finds that it had been dead for several days.51 The soldier is identified as a 
member of the British army on guard the night that the 11th armoured division arrived at the 
camp, yet no description is provided for the woman aside from her desperate search for food 
for her child. The trauma of this interaction is therefore conveyed from the perspective of 
having witnessed it as opposed to directly experiencing it. 
The limiting of identifying information about the victims of the camps was an active 
decision made by BBC news editors. The extent of the horror relayed in the report almost 
prevented its broadcast, and it was only when Dimbleby threatened to resign that executives 
agreed to release a shortened version that was edited to remove references to the victims as 
Jews.52 As opposed to contextualising the horrors of Belsen within the context of almost ten 
years of anti-Jewish policymaking, the camp was positioned as a more generic emblem of Nazi 
barbarity. The obfuscation of the majority of the victims’ Jewish identity as a means to exalt 
the actions of the British military during the conflict is further exemplified by the deliberate 
effort to present the suffering at Belsen as the reason for Britain’s involvement in the war.  For 
example, a 1945 news directive instructed reporters to ‘show that this [the scenes at the 
concentration camps] was the justification of the war. It is the answer to those who did not 
believe atrocity stories’.53 Thus, the coverage of Belsen concentration camp was shaped by the 
desire to cast British actions in a positive light, and to avoid any critical reflection on British 
responses to Jewish refugees prior to 1945.   
The transmission of Dimbleby’s report via the BBC and in line with the instruction to 
avoid references to the fact that the majority of its prisoners were Jewish indicates the 
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development of a British political memory of the Holocaust. The intentional portrayal of the 
devastation of the camp as the rationale behind Britain’s involvement in the Second World War 
helped to justify the loss of over 380,000 British soldiers during the conflict, presenting the 
British military as an unambiguously heroic institution. This narrative was legitimised by its 
retelling by an established and trustworthy source. As a result, questions of national 
responsibility for the deaths of those who were denied asylum were evaded, and Britain could 
be upheld as a haven for those suffering persecution and discrimination.  
 The way in which the images of Belsen were mediated to the British public in 1945 can 
be understood using Landsberg’s prosthetic memory. Prosthetic memories ‘emerge at the 
interface between a person and a historical narrative about the past, at an experiential site such 
as a movie theatre or museum’.54 The technology available to the majority of Britons in 1945 
means that reports like Dimbleby’s would have been engaged with in communal settings, either 
by a shared radio or, in the case of newsreel footage, in cinema settings. This creates the 
communal, immersive atmosphere necessary for the development of a prosthetic memory. 
Additionally, unlike typical news reporting, Dimbleby’s report was a monologue and relied on 
similes and metaphors to convey the horrors of the camp. This unusual, even unprecedented, 
reporting style would have captured listeners’ attention and reiterated the gravity of the 
situation, creating an immersive quality that evoked a visceral response. Furthermore, the use 
of metaphorical language indicates the creation metaphysical Holocaust narrative, in which 
abstract concepts of morality and “lessons” are prioritised over the historical context of the 
event. This metaphysical narrative again helped to avoid questions about problematic past 
actions on the part of the British government, instead prioritising abstract metaphors of the 
triumph of “good” over “evil”.  
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 According to Landsberg’s original definition of prosthetic memory, audiences would 
share in the experience of the victims of a traumatic event. However, as previously discussed, 
these reports tended to prioritise the experience of liberating forces over the identification of 
the victims. The prosthetic memory of Belsen as representative of the Nazi genocide therefore 
enabled viewers to identify with the camps’ liberators more than its victims. As a result, 
listeners were experiencing the shock of witnessing the suffering at Belsen as a prosthetic 
memory, while vicariously also experiencing the pride of being part of the nation that relieved 
it. The development of such a memory supported the broader, political narrative of the past, 
stifling criticism of wartime actions with the powerful and dominant narrative of Britain as a 
saviour nation.  
The typical presentation of the Holocaust in dualistic terms, establishing Germany as 
the perpetrator and defeated nation, and Britain as the liberator of the camps and victor in the 
war, meant that in Britain, there was little reason for more nuanced, critical engagement with 
the past. This attitude is also reflected in the minimal engagement with the proceedings of the 
International Military Tribunal (IMT), and the responses to returning British POWs: Sharples 
has found that immediately after the war, the British general public was ‘unencumbered by any 
issues of guilt or responsibility’ and therefore showed a lack of interest in the prosecution of 
Nazi war criminals; and Duncan Little’s research into the treatment of British POWs held at 
E715, a camp within the Auschwitz compound, has revealed an unwillingness to engage with 
eyewitness accounts of suffering that did not centre around an overarching narrative of 
heroism.55 On top of this, the tumultuous socio-political circumstances of the immediate post-
war period required the prioritisation of stability over self-reflection. As interest in the IMT 
waned and the growing threat of the USSR came to the forefront in the British political sphere, 
there was little to no reception for works that expressed the extent of suffering during the war. 
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A self-glorifying, metaphysical narrative thus took root in Britain, and would remain 
unchallenged in the decades that followed.   
 
British Holocaust Engagement in the 1960s 
Throughout the 1950s, there was minimal public or state interest in memorialising and teaching 
about the Nazi genocide. Despite a concerted effort from Holocaust survivors such as Primo 
Levi, there was simply little public reception for eyewitness accounts of Jewish suffering 
during the war. 56 Outside of Britain, this changed in the 1960s, when high media coverage of 
trials against National Socialist leaders sparked an awareness of the Holocaust based on 
victims’ experiences rather than perpetrators’. For example, the trial and execution of senior 
SS official Adolf Eichmann by the Israeli secret service was televised globally and arguably 
marked a turning point in public understanding of the Nazi genocide. The centring of the trial 
around victims’ experiences shook existing understandings of the Holocaust as a historical 
event and emphasised its ongoing impact on human beings. 57 
 The renewed awareness of the Nazi genocide was taken up by some of the popular 
protest movements in the late 1960s, enabling past injustices to act as an historical justification 
for attacks on contemporary societal figures and structures. Rothberg suggests that 
‘multidirectional memory is often the very grounds on which people construct and act upon 
visions of justice’.58 As such, emergence of a multidirectional Holocaust memory can be 
identified in the protest movements, which broke out around the world in the late 1960s in 
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response to the excessive use of force by American troops in Vietnam; to the inequalities 
reinforced by existing societal structures; and in relation to civil rights movements globally.59 
In West Germany, dissatisfaction with existing political figures and structures was intensified 
by the memory of the Holocaust as protestors began to recognise and condemn national leaders’ 
participation in the Nazi dictatorship.  
Young Germans’ attacks on the capitalist system were shaped around a disgust for 
National Socialism. For example, demonstrators carried placards that compared American 
President Lyndon B Johnson with Adolf Hitler, equating the brutality shown by the US in 
Vietnam with the barbarity of Nazism.60 Similarly in 1967, member of the radical leftist terror 
group the Rote Armee Faktion (RAF) denounced the West German authorities as “Generation 
Auschwitz” in response to the shooting of an unarmed protestor.61 The conflation of 
contemporary acts of violence with the atrocities committed by the Nazis as a means to bring 
about societal change and construct a new sense of moral understanding thus indicates the 
development of a multidirectional West German Holocaust memory. The manner in which this 
memory emerged suggests the development of a metaphysical narrative, where present-day 
issues are made sense of by being placed within metaphorical framework of historical trauma. 
 The emergence of this multidirectional memory of the Holocaust in West Germany was 
reliant upon a contemporary trigger, which can help to explain why the same introspective 
discussions of the Second World War did not emerge in 1960s Britain. Of course, it is not 
necessarily surprising that criticism of contemporary society in West Germany was related to 
the Nazi past; Nazism was initially a German political and social ideology. Yet it is notable 
that while such vocal conversations were taking place about the roles of historical authority 
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figures, there was not a period of reflection in Britain. It is perhaps because of this absence of 
self-reflection that British national identity has often been able to be defined by the experience 
of the Second World War.  
The lack of a re-evaluation of national history in Britain can be attributed to the 
perception of the Holocaust as a distant, if traumatic, event. Whereas the process of 
reconstruction in West Germany had necessitated a period of Vergangenheitsbewältingung – 
the process of coming to terms with the past – the consolidation of a memory of the Holocaust 
in Britain in 1945 intentionally avoided any national self-criticism. In Germany, a direct link 
could be made from current political figures to the Nazi past, but in Britain the wartime leaders, 
in particular Churchill, had been positioned as national heroes within the national political, 
prosthetic memory of the Second World War. As such, the Eichmann Trial and other 
manifestations of Holocaust memory did not spark a period of introspection because it had 
been long understood that Britain bore no responsibility for the mass murder of European Jews 
during the Second World War. This understanding had resulted in a metaphysical narrative of 
the Holocaust that reduced World War Two to a matter of absolute evil of Nazism defeated by 
absolute good of British forces. Therefore, there was little sense in attempting to mobilise the 
memory of national actions during the Holocaust to confront contemporary institutional and 
societal inequality.  
 
British Holocaust Engagement in the 1980s 
The events of the 1960s did not result in a wider, public self-critical engagement with the 
actions of the wartime government in Britain, yet in the years that followed there was a gradual 
increase in academic interest in exploring these more problematic areas of the national past. In 
the 1980s, historians including A J Sherman, Bernard Wasserstein and Martin Gilbert were 
beginning to explore Britain’s experience of the Holocaust in more critical terms, marking a 
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departure from previous engagement that had tended to focus on the mechanics of the Nazis’ 
mass murder policies. However, London has stressed the fact that they were published over a 
decade after similar analyses had appeared in American historical studies.62 At the same time 
as these historical studies emerged, efforts were being made to reflect on the Holocaust in a 
metaphysical sense. For example, pedagogical organisations such as the Inner London 
Education Authority (ILEA) developed a teaching resource titled Auschwitz: Yesterday’s 
Racism that encouraged teachers and students to consider the relevance of the Holocaust to 
contemporary injustices.63 Viewing the Holocaust as a source of lessons for contemporary 
society conflicted with more traditional historical perceptions of the Nazi genocide as a 
traumatic past event.  
  As a more critical engagement with the Holocaust appeared to be taking root, the 
Anglo-Jewish community began to call for the establishment of a national memorial to the 
victims of the Holocaust. Plans for this national memorial were first devised by the Board of 
Deputies of British Jews in response to Yehuda Bauer’s assertion that ‘in Britain, nothing at 
all has been done’ to remember the Nazis’ victims.64 The development of the project was 
exceptionally complex and convoluted, seeing several restructures of organisational bodies and 
countless disagreements over the site’s design, contents and location.65 Eventually, in 1983, 
the memorial was constructed in Hyde Park and opened to the public. It featured a large stone 
inscribed with the quotation “For these I weep, streams of tears flow from my eyes because of 
the destruction of my people”66 written both in English and in Hebrew, which was embedded 
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within a memorial garden. It was intended that the stone would ‘blend into the park and into 
the lives of and memories of Britain’s people, Jews and non-Jews alike’.67  
 The adherence to pre-existing Holocaust narratives in Britain that enabled a positive 
national self-identification and precluded discussions of more problematic areas of wartime 
actions is evident in the government’s response to the creation of this memorial site. Whereas 
it is now expected that plans for new memorials will spark significant debates, the planning 
process of the Hyde Park Memorial attracted little support or opposition.68 The fact that the 
government agreed to the creation of the memorial should also not be interpreted as an effort 
to counter this general public indifference to the history of the Nazi genocide; indeed, as Pearce 
has noted, its creation was simply ‘more palatable than endorsing educational initiatives aimed 
at exploring the present-day relevance of the genocide’.69 In fact, the British government was 
clear in its refusal to help finance the project, with the then Secretary of State for the 
Environment Michael Heseltine declaring that ‘if a memorial like this cannot attract enough 
private support it is not worth erecting it in the first place’.70 Heseltine’s comment in and of 
itself reveals that in the early 1980s, the Holocaust was still perceived as an event that had little 
relevance to non-Jewish British national culture or identity. 
The issues highlighted by government officials during the planning stages of the Hyde 
Park Memorial echo the liberal concerns that coloured wartime government’s response to 
Jewish refugees from Nazism; as has been suggested by Cooke, the site ‘is structured by the 
particular historical relationship between the Board of Deputies – as the Anglo-Jewish élite – 
and the British state’.71 For example, the government’s rejection of the Board of Deputies’ 
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suggestions to construct the memorial either in the Jewel House Gardens or along the river 
frontage of Lambeth Palace was attributed to a fear that such prominent locations could 
provoke antisemitic attacks.72 This reasoning evokes the wartime perception that allowing 
entry to Britain to significant numbers of Jews would stoke domestic antisemitism. Similarly, 
the intentional blending of the memorial into the surrounding landscape calls to mind the 
expectation for Jewish communities to assimilate into British culture. This is all the more 
relevant in light of Cooke’s observation that the memorial becomes ‘indistinct as it merges into 
the English landscape’.73 Finally, the expectation for Anglo-Jewish organisations to shoulder 
the financial cost of the site can be related to the wartime responsibility of the Jewish 
community to support refugees. Thus, the connections between the state response to the Hyde 
Park Holocaust Memorial in 1983 and the response to Jewish refugees between 1933 and 1948 
indicate that longstanding British perceptions of the Holocaust persisted in commemorative 
efforts almost forty years after the end of the Second World War. Both the location and form 
of the Hyde Park Holocaust Memorial help to further minimise the particular identity of the 
Holocaust’s victims, reinforcing liberal values of a homogeneous national identity.  
 
British Holocaust Engagement in the 1990s 
In contrast to the early 1980s, the 1990s saw a rapid increase in political and cultural interest 
in the Nazi genocide. A rise in individuals’ awareness of the Holocaust can be attributed to a 
range of factors. The tearing down of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the gradual collapse of the 
Soviet Union not only improved communication between Western and European states, but 
also opened up previously inaccessible historical archives. As a result, a wealth of new 
information about the Holocaust was made available to Western European historians for the 
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first time. As well as this unprecedented geopolitical shift, British societal identity was also 
undergoing a period of realignment. Whereas an emphasis on cultural assimilation had 
prevailed for the most part of the twentieth century due to the dominance of a liberal ideology, 
in the 1990s national values were increasingly shaped around multiculturalism and pluralism. 
As a result, Anglo-Jewish communities were able to speak more openly about the need to 
recognise and commemorate the atrocities committed against Jews by the Nazis.74  
               Jewish communities’ increased confidence in speaking out about the particularly 
antisemitic nature of the Nazi genocide was compounded by a growing sense of urgency to 
ensure justice had been served for all parties as survivors and perpetrators aged. In the late 
1980s, the British public was outraged by the fact that Nazi war criminals had been living and 
working in Britain since the end of the war without facing prosecution.75 Furthermore, efforts 
to compensate Holocaust survivors and their families for their loss of property during the 
Holocaust, such as the 1997 London Conference on Nazi Gold, not only drew public attention 
to the ongoing human impact of the Nazi genocide, but also  highlighted the need for improved 
education and remembrance practices in Britain.76 This social interest in the Holocaust was 
met by the development of cultural representations of the period. Particularly influential was 
Steven Spielberg’s phenomenally successful film Schindler’s List (1993) that follows the 
efforts of Oskar Schindler to rescue hundreds of Polish Jews from Nazi persecution. As has 
been discussed by Landsberg, this film may have been one of the first times that global, and 
therefore also British, audiences had some visceral inkling of how it felt to be a Jew during the 
Holocaust.77 The rise in public awareness of the Nazi genocide in the 1990s also took on a new 
importance as British audiences were shocked by news of contemporary genocides: in Bosnia, 
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where approximately 100,000 Bosnian Muslims were killed by Serb forces between 1992 and 
1995,78 and in Rwanda, where up to one million Tutsis were murdered on the orders of a Hutu 
government in 1994.79 These atrocities were often discussed and understood through the lens 
of the Holocaust. 
               In different ways, these factors all contributed to a greater cultural and political 
awareness of the Holocaust in Britain. Perhaps the most obvious sign that representing the Nazi 
genocide had taken on a new political significance was its inclusion as a mandatory area of 
study in the first National Curriculum of 1991. At the end of the 1980s, the British government 
announced a series of reforms to the existing tripartite school system in the 1988 Educational 
Reform Act. A cornerstone of these reforms was the creation of a cohesive national curriculum 
that would standardise the areas studied by British pupils in state-maintained schools. Tense 
debates broke out over what should be included within the History syllabus, reflecting a 
perception of historical awareness as a facet of national identity building. The History Working 
Group (HWG), an organisation established to determine which areas of history should be 
taught, originally suggested World War Two as an optional area of study, and did not mention 
the Holocaust.80 Though the majority of the outrage over this decision was targeted at the 
exclusion of the Second World War, pressure was also put on the HWG from the Anglo-Jewish 
community, the newly formed pressure group the Holocaust Educational Trust (HET), and a 
small group of cross-party MPs.81 Following extensive lobbying from these groups, the HWG 
eventually proposed that the Nazi genocide should be a compulsory area of study for Key Stage 
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4 students within a broader unit looking at the Second World War.82 Yet, due to further 
reshuffling of curriculum’s contents largely brought about by Kenneth Clarke that saw history 
removed as a mandatory Key Stage 4 subject, the twentieth century elements were ‘severed 
from the Key Stage 4 curriculum, and unceremoniously dumped into Key Stage 3’.83 The 
position of Holocaust education was consolidated in 1995 and since then has, perhaps 
unexpectedly, not only remained a mandatory area of study, but has taken on an increasing 
importance in the British school system.  
              The inclusion of the Holocaust within the first National Curriculum has a political 
inflection not only because it was part of governmental policymaking, but also in the sense of 
Assmann’s political memory. School curricula will rarely stand independently from broader 
social and political circumstances. Indeed, Pearce has noted that the ideological calibration of 
a curriculum reflects the constellations of power and influence around it’.84 This inherently 
political nature of educational policymaking was compounded by the explicit intentions of the 
1988 Educational Reform Act to position school education as a site of national identity 
building. The reforms were pitched as a counter to an alleged degradation of social values and 
educational standards since the 1970s.85   
               Holocaust education had existed in British schools prior to the National Curriculum. 
Survey work by historian John P Fox conducted in 1987 with financial support from the Yad 
Vashem Charitable Trust (YVCT) reflected the concerns relayed during the Historikerstreit. 
While most respondents recognised that teaching about the Nazi genocide was important, Fox 
found that the delivery of Holocaust education was beset by teachers’ uncertainty regarding 
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how it should be taught, resulting its common portrayal as ‘abstract example or backcloth for 
discussion of other issues’.86 These factors meant that the Holocaust education that did exist 
was often one-dimensional, metaphysical and failed to contextualise Nazism and the 
extermination of European Jews within a historical framework. Taking into account the 1988 
Educational Reform Act’s conceptualisation of the purpose of education as well as the general 
nature of school curricula, it is evident that the development of a political memory of the 
Holocaust was not meant to confront the problematic metaphysical narratives identified by 
Fox. Instead, these narratives were adapted and reworked to respond to contemporary national 
social and political needs. This contention is supported by Pearce’s characterisation of the 
politicians involved in the campaign for Holocaust education, who generally ‘tied the 
Holocaust to a self-congratulatory British war memory’87, considered it to be a reference point 
for contemporary issues facing minority groups, and minimised the specific suffering of Jews.88 
Their perception of the meaning of the Holocaust, in addition to the implicitly political nature 
of the National Curriculum and educational reforms, indicates an effort to develop a 
metaphysical, political Holocaust memory during the 1990s.  
 One of the ways in which this was achieved was through the work of the HET. The 
HET was originally established with the purpose of ensuring the Holocaust’s inclusion within 
the history syllabus, but it not dissolve once this aim had been achieved. Instead, the 
organisation has gone on to provide teaching resources, training and targeted pedagogical 
programmes to supplement in-school education. Here, I focus on the Lessons from Auschwitz 
(LfA) initiative, a training programme for students aged sixteen and above that centres around 
a one-day visit to Auschwitz concentration camp; this was devised in 1999 and financially 
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supported by the government. Since it was first introduced, over 41,000 people have taken part 
in the initiative.89  
The LfA programme is organised into four sessions, attendance at all of which is 
compulsory. Firstly, participants take part in an orientation session, where they learn about pre-
war Jewish life and attend a talk by a Holocaust survivor. The aim of this first part is to ensure 
a basic historical knowledge and to challenges any pre-existing myths or misconceptions. 
Having completed orientation, the group then travels to Oświeçim, seeing the areas where 
Jewish life had flourished before the Nazi occupation before visiting Auschwitz concentration 
camp. This visit is particularly intense, with participants flying to Poland in the morning and 
returning the same evening. The HET consequently runs a follow up session, encouraging 
students to reflect on their personal experiences of the visit and think about the importance of 
learning about the Holocaust for the present day. Finally, a “Next Steps” session is held, where 
individuals must provide a short piece of writing outlining the impact LfA has had on them, 
and provide some evidence of their plans to share what they have learnt with their community 
at home.90  
 The overarching intention of LfA is to teach participants about the Holocaust as a means 
to alter their own personal values, and to inspire them to confront contemporary intolerance 
and discrimination at home. The blurring of education with more general concepts of morality 
is evident in the conclusion of the camp visit with a memorial service that is held next to the 
destroyed crematoria.91 The collocation of education and commemoration gives greater gravity 
to the act of learning about the Holocaust, while also leading participants to reflect on the 
historical trauma of the Nazi genocide and its relevance to their own lives. The requirement for 
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students to bring what they have learnt into their own communities indicates the expectation 
for Holocaust education and remembrance to offer particular lessons about humanity and 
morality, thus signalling the presence of a metaphysical narrative. The impact of this approach 
has been identified in a study of Scottish teachers who have participated in the LfA programme. 
Though respondents did on the whole report that the programme had improved their awareness 
of the historical facts of the Holocaust, this historical knowledge was often accompanied 
references to more general social issues. For example, one respondent reported that the visit to 
Auschwitz ‘re-affirmed my views and feelings about human rights, equality issues and the 
refugee situation today’92, while another stated that ‘it gave me a new impetus in my teaching 
about human rights’.93 Such statements suggest that the 1990s Holocaust education did not 
confront existing and often problematic conceptualisations of the Nazi genocide as an abstract 
source of moral lessons, but instead helped to reinforce this narrative.  
 Political memory is not established arbitrarily, but signal a moment when ‘history is 
put to the service of identity formation, when it is appropriated by citizens and attested to by 
politicians’.94 The decision to inculcate a political memory of the Holocaust via school 
education can thus be understood as a response to broader social circumstances. Firstly, the 
government’s agreement to independent organisations’ calls for the inclusion of Holocaust 
education in the National Curriculum can be interpreted as a response to the rise of critical 
evaluations of Britain’s role in the war and subsequent treatment of Jewish refugees.95 
Incorporating Holocaust education into the state-organised National Curriculum may have 
presented an opportunity to reinforce the dominant narratives of British national heroism seen 
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throughout the twentieth century, thus diluting these more problematic actions. The idea that 
British political interest in Holocaust education in the 1990s partly came from a desire to 
restrict more critical analyses is supported by Pearce’s characterisation of the MPs who worked 
alongside independent Holocaust education organisations.  
As well as preserving a positive national understanding of the wartime government’s 
actions, the decision to publicly commit to teaching and learning about the Holocaust should 
be viewed in light of ongoing humanitarian crises. Contemporary instances of genocide and 
the lack of Western intervention also saw a rise in discussions of the Holocaust. This might be 
explained using Rothberg’s multidirectional memory; it could be argued that ongoing 
genocides led people to look at past instances of mass murder in order to make sense of the 
present. This conclusion can be called into question, however, by the fact that Holocaust 
memory work was increasingly taking place at a political level. As opposed to contemporary 
acts of genocide sparking a discussion of past actions, it is possible that the renewed political 
interest in the Nazi genocide served to counter criticisms of state inaction in present-day crises 
by pointing to more distant example of apparently positive British national actions. 
Referencing the existing, self-congratulatory political memory of the Holocaust may have 
helped to reassure Britons about present day inaction by highlighting past heroism during the 
Second World War. 
The implementation of mandatory Holocaust education as a state initiative enabled the 
Government to regain control of the dominant Holocaust narrative, limiting the reach and 
impact of more critical discussions of the past. Furthermore, political commitment to Holocaust 
commemoration can be viewed as a response to state inaction in the face of contemporary 
genocide. This can also help to explain the presentation of Holocaust remembrance as a 
symbolic victory against oppressors that I will discuss below in relation to the Holocaust 
Memorial Day ceremonies held in the 2000s.  
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Section I: Summary 
In this section, I have aimed to add to existing research into the development of Britain’s 
Holocaust consciousness by considering key events in terms of memory studies theories. The 
initial memory of the Holocaust that was established in 1945 can be understood as a political 
narrative mediated as a prosthetic memory. As a result, audiences were able to engage with the 
severity of the Nazi genocide while simultaneously taking pride in national actions. This meant 
that attention was detracted from more damning aspects of the British war effort, including the 
failure to destroy the infrastructure of the Holocaust or to accept greater numbers of Jewish 
refugees from Nazism.  
The unambiguously positive narrative of British wartime actions persisted in the 
ensuing decades, helping to account for the unique trajectory of Britain’s Holocaust 
consciousness. Here I have referred to the emergence of a critical engagement with dominant 
narratives of the Holocaust in West Germany in the 1960s as an example of a multidirectional 
memory. Whereas young Germans were able to confront contemporary societal inequalities by 
referencing the horrors of the Nazi genocide, British understandings of the Second World War 
were grounded in the metaphorical presentation of the national triumph over evil. This 
therefore meant that wartime authority figures, in particular Winston Churchill, were able to 
take on a role of national heroes, again precluding a critical evaluation of the Second World 
War.  The narrative of British national heroism can once again be identified in the 1980s, as 
the Anglo-Jewish community began to call for the creation of a national Holocaust memorial 
site. Whereas in the US and in West Germany, the 1980s saw similar proposals develop into 
extensive debates, there was a muted response amongst the British general public and 
government. Thus, in the 1980s the remembering the Holocaust continued to be considered a 
Jewish responsibility.  
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The 1990s, however, saw the rapid, and perhaps unexpected, realignment of political 
engagement with the Nazi genocide. This is evidenced by the inclusion of the Holocaust as a 
mandatory subject in the first National Curriculum and by support for international 
remembrance organisations. The relatively sudden political interest in promoting Holocaust 
remembrance and education can be viewed as a response to increasingly critical discussions of 
Britain’s wartime actions, and to the government’s failure to act in response to contemporary 
atrocities. By taking the lead on remembrance initiatives, the government was able to reinforce 
pre-existing narratives of national heroism, limiting the impact of critical readings of the 
national past and present.  
 In the following section, I consider the ways in which this persistent narrative of 
national heroism has been affected by the ostensibly transnationalisation of Holocaust memory 
since the turn of the twenty-first century. To do so, I analyse the ways in which a range of post-
2000 manifestations of Holocaust remembrance and education reflect on Britain’s past and 
present-day actions. From this investigation, it becomes apparent that the understanding of 
Britain as the heroic nation in the Second World War that was formed in 1945 and developed 
throughout the twentieth century has continued to inform commemorative and pedagogical 








Section II: Twenty-First Century Holocaust Remembrance 
In the previous section, I outlined the ways in which a Holocaust memory narrative emerged 
and has been consolidated in Britain throughout the twentieth century that typically casts 
national wartime actions in an unambiguously positive light. According to the dominant 
transnational trend in the field of memory studies, the adherence to a particular national 
narrative should have been disrupted by the development of multinational remembrance 
agreements and organisations – such as the Stockholm Declaration and the IHRA - established 
at the start of the twenty-first century. However, more recently transnational readings of 
Holocaust commemoration have been re-evaluated, suggesting that the ostensible shift towards 
a globalised collective memory of the Nazi past is primarily a matter of political rhetoric. 
 In this section, I firstly outline the processes that led to the creation of the IHRA, and 
provide an overview of the projects the organisation has overseen since its creation in 2000. 
The significance of these memory projects is outlined with reference to Helmut Dubiel’s 
analysis of the conference as an effort to consolidate a foundational myth for a collective, Pan-
European Identity. I then expand the existing criticism of transnational readings of the SIF 
further in relation to the political rejection of the EU marked by the 2016 Brexit referendum. 
To achieve this aim, I firstly consider the ways in which manifestations of Holocaust 
remembrance and education have transformed in Britain from the 2000s to the 2010s. I outline 
the development of Holocaust representation in the IWM’s permanent Holocaust exhibition 
and in HMD commemorative ceremonies, indicating the ways in which a prioritisation of 
national needs has persisted in twenty-first century Holocaust representation. This analysis 
reveals that the implicit prioritisation of British needs has come to the forefront in more recent 
commemorations held around the time of the Brexit referendum. I then highlight the ways in 
which this realignment of British national Holocaust commemoration has been made all the 
more obvious in the plans for the UK Holocaust Memorial and Learning Centre (UKHMLC). 
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From this analysis, it is apparent that state-level engagement with the Nazi genocide continues 
to be shaped by broader national political needs.  
 
The SIF, the Stockholm Declaration and IHRA 
The unexpected development of political involvement in Holocaust remembrance and 
education continued to grow at the turn of the twenty-first century, as Holocaust 
commemoration began to be envisioned not as the responsibility of each individual nation, but 
as a matter that required international co-operation. Arguably the most impactful event was the 
2000 Stockholm International Forum (SIF), which was held on January 27 2000 to 
commemorate the 55th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz. The convening of an 
international conference that aimed to define the Holocaust and promote initiatives that would 
improve the quality of Holocaust education and research was the culmination of three years of 
work carried out in Sweden under Prime Minister Göran Persson. In 1997, survey work had 
uncovered in the Swedish youth a lack of knowledge and understanding about the Holocaust, 
a rise in support for right-wing political movements, and a popular enjoyment of White Power 
music.96 In response, Persson launched a public information campaign titled Living History, 
and commissioned a series of new training programmes and pedagogical resources that were 
underpinned by the themes of ‘democracy, tolerance and equality’.97  Though Living History 
was a Swedish national project developed to counter particular domestic issues, it had a 
significant impact across Europe.   
 The international popularity of Living History and, perhaps more cynically, Persson’s 
own desire to hold a more significant European leadership role, led to the creation of the 
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International Task Force for Holocaust Research, Remembrance and Education (ITF) in 
1998.98 The founding members of this group included Persson, US President Bill Clinton and 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair. In the following two years, Germany, Israel, Poland, Italy, 
France and the Netherlands would also become members of the ITF. The SIF was held to 
formalise this organisation’s aims and to develop a plan for further projects, and was attended 
by representatives from 46 governments. 99 In 2012, the ITF was renamed the International 
Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) to reflect the permanence of the project, which is 
how I will refer to it from here on.  
 One of the main purposes of the SIF was to develop a shared international 
understanding of the Nazi genocide that would pave the way for future Holocaust 
commemorative and educational projects. Attendees’ commitment to such projects was 
symbolically confirmed in the Stockholm Declaration. Though not legally binding, this 
declaration outlined eight proposals to improve knowledge and understanding of the Nazi 
genocide. These terms included: the establishment of a shared definition of the Holocaust, its 
scale and its lasting impact; a recognition of Holocaust memory as a means to counter 
contemporary intolerance; commitment to further Holocaust education, remembrance and 
research; the establishment of an international Day of Holocaust Remembrance; plans to 
develop existing knowledge about the Holocaust and explore lesser known aspects; and an 
overarching aim of working towards a better future.100  The Stockholm Declaration was then 
adopted as the foundational document of the IHRA. 
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The extent to which the SIF and its resultant research and commemorative projects can 
be understood as an effort to construct a Pan-European identity has been assessed by Helmut 
Dubiel. In his analysis of the SIF, Dubiel is careful to reiterate that the creation of a shared 
European understanding of the Nazi past and approach to its commemoration is not capable of 
entirely supplanting individuals’ identification with their own nation state. Yet he contends that 
a shared understanding of the Holocaust forges a ‘“negative” paradigm of human bonding that 
is built on the legacy of human catastrophe’101, providing a common framework through which 
subsequent horrific events can be understood. Since the Holocaust and devastating wars of the 
twentieth century ‘exploded the boundaries of state citizenship and ethnic and class 
belonging’102, the SIF could step in as a unifying institution that could help to reaffirm human 
solidarity and identity. 
Therefore, the presentation of the Holocaust and its relevance to the present day at the 
SIF can be understood as an effort to establish a European foundational myth. Dubiel defines 
foundational myths as ‘constructed narratives which extract an important event of the common 
past from the historical continuum in which is it embedded, endow it with mythical qualities, 
and turn it into a starting point of communal history’.103 The SIF helps to unify modern states 
by developing a shared historical understanding of the past, a common understanding of its 
relevance to present and future generations, and a framework on which acts of remembrance 
should be structured. Indeed, despite the fact that it is not an official legal document, agreement 
to the terms of the Stockholm Declaration is now considered to be an informal condition for 
membership of the EU.104 
																																																						
101 Dubiel, p.60. 
102 Ibid, p.70. 
103 Ibid, p.68. 
104 Allwork, p.11. 
	 50 
The terminology used in the terms of the Stockholm Declaration indicates that this 
European foundational myth is based around a metaphysical Holocaust narrative at the SIF. 
The Stockholm Declaration’s authors called for delegates to ensure that the Holocaust is 
‘forever seared in our collective memory’105 through education, remembrance and the 
confrontation of Holocaust denial or distortion. Similarly, it states that the atrocities committed 
by the Nazis had left ‘an indelible scar across Europe’.106 The emotive language used in these 
statements unifies member countries within a physically painful experience of recalling the 
traumatic past of the Holocaust. The metaphysical understanding of the Holocaust is also 
conveyed through its presentation as an event that transcends history and nationality, and 
resonates around the world. For example, the Declaration pledges members’ ‘commitment to 
plant the seeds of a better future amidst the soil of a bitter past’107 in order to ‘reaffirm 
humanity’s common aspiration for mutual understanding and justice’.108 Additionally, the it 
states that ‘the unprecedented nature of the Holocaust will always hold universal meaning’.109 
As a result, the Holocaust is removed from its historical context and come to represent a 
metaphorical source of lessons about modern moral values and behaviours. As such, the SIF 
should be interpreted as an effort to instil a common European identity grounded in an 
ostensibly shared historic experience, as opposed to solely aiming to ensure future generations’ 
historical understanding of the past. 
The number of events, programmes and projects dedicated to commemorating the 
Holocaust and expanding the existing body of research has grown significantly as a result of 
the SIF and the creation of the Stockholm Declaration in 2000. The designation of 27 January 
as a shared Holocaust Memorial Day (HMD), as proposed in the Stockholm Declaration, has 
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become a key event on the political calendar around the world. Additionally, the SIF acted as 
the model for biannual plenary conferences held in the country currently holding the presidency 
of the IHRA. At these conferences, member countries work together to outline the year’s events 
which can tackle ‘issues related to Holocaust education, research and remembrance in the 
international political arena’.110 The current focus areas of the IHRA discussed in these 
conferences are: Antisemitism, Holocaust Denial and Distortion; Archives and Research; 
Education; Genocide of the Roma; Holocaust, Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity; 
Remembrance; and Safeguarding Sites.111  
The development of a homogeneous collective Holocaust memory in the SIF was not 
only intended as a means to engage with the past, but also as a tool to confront contemporary 
instances of societal intolerance and even genocide. Allwork has attributed the initial appeal of 
membership to the ITF to ‘pan-liberal anxieties over not only the extreme right but also the 
increasing success of radical right-wing parties in the 1990s’.112 As such, it can be argued that 
the roots of European commemorative activity in the twenty-first century lie within the bounds 
of contemporary political needs as opposed to solely representing a desire to preserve the 
memory of the Holocaust and ensure future generations’ historical knowledge. This aim was 
particularly pertinent given the development of this commemoration work took place in the 
aftermath of contemporary genocidal events in Bosnia and Rwanda in the 1990s. 
Relating other atrocities to Holocaust history and memory is one of the focus areas of 
the IHRA, as is outlined in a 2016 report titled “History Never Repeats itself, but Sometimes 
It Rhymes: Comparing the Holocaust to Different Atrocities”.113 This paper, which is intended 
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for use in education and museum settings, outlines the ways in which the Holocaust should and 
should not be used in order to cast light on subsequent atrocities. It states that it is only 
appropriate to relate the Holocaust to other acts of brutality if they share thematic similarities, 
or to help identify the characteristics of a genocide.114 The report concludes with the assertion 
that ‘careful Holocaust comparison through scholarship, education and commemoration can 
enhance learning and understanding our world, build bridges between communities, and guide 
political action today’.115 From this guidance, it is clear that the IHRA conceives of Holocaust 
memory not only as a means to transform persecutory political movements, but goes further to 
suggest that a better awareness of the atrocities committed by the Nazis would have prevented 
their emergence in the first place.  
 
The SIF and Memory Theory 
Dubiel’s contention that the SIF represented an effort to consolidate a collective European 
foundational myth has been supported by memory studies theorists, in particular Levy and 
Sznaider. Levy and Sznaider argue that the Jewish diaspora is a precursor to a globalised, 
cosmopolitan world, meaning that the Holocaust can be interpreted as ‘an attack on 
cosmopolitanism’116, and thus ‘is the event that best expresses the value of 
cosmopolitanism’.117 According to their conceptualisation of Holocaust memory, multinational 
remembrance efforts have resulted in the subordination of national identities to ‘the symbolic 
power of a victim-centred, cosmopolitan memory’.118 By this logic, twenty-first century 
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multinational commemorative activity represents an effort to construct a homogeneous, global 
identity and set of moral values based on the memory of the victims of the Nazi genocide. 
 On the surface, Levy and Sznaider’s analysis of Holocaust memory in the global age 
appears to accurately describe the nature of the memory work carried out at the SIF in 2000 
and its resultant projects and programmes. Their perception of Holocaust memory as a unifying 
collective memory that transposes ostensibly unrelated incidents onto a broader, globalised 
framework can be justified by the commemorative and educational stance taken in the IHRA’s 
documentation as well as its institutional actions. Yet, as Allwork and Van der Poel have 
shown, national membership of organisations such as IHRA has not necessarily guaranteed a 
re-evaluation of pre-existing Holocaust memory narratives. 
The notion that Eastern European states have developed a memory of the Holocaust for 
national purposes that conflicts with the outward narrative in support of SIF commemorations 
can also be applied to the British national context. Doing so would suggest that the obscuring 
of problematic areas of Britain’s past through participation in European projects is actually two 
concurrent processes. On the one hand, Britain in the 2000s was taking part in European 
memory work, reflecting the political goal of reinforcing its national eminence in the EU. On 
the other, the construction of a common European narrative was appealing to British political 
figures precisely because it did not require a reassessment of pre-existing, unassailable 
historical narratives. Furthermore, Allwork’s criticism of the affixation of the term 
cosmopolitan to post-SIF memory work can shed light on the persistence of positive British 
national narratives in spite of their role in consolidating European remembrance organisations. 
Her undermining of the cosmopolitan understanding of the SIF enables the discrepancy 
between narrative and action to come more clearly into focus, thus indicating that the adherence 
to positive British self-understanding could not be reversed by the institution of Pan-European 
memory project. These arguments become all the more pertinent in light of the shift in British 
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Holocaust memory from the universalised, moral narratives of the early twentieth century to 
the explicit national focus in the 2010s.  
 This kind of re-evaluation has begun to appear in more recent analyses of Britain’s 
engagement of with the Holocaust. Dan Stone, for example, identifies similar issues as those 
outlined by Allwork and Van der Poel in the implementation of Europeanised narratives of the 
Holocaust in Britain, yet does not challenge Levy and Sznaider’s interpretation of the SIF as 
emblematic of cosmopolitan Holocaust memory. Indeed, he agrees with their contention that 
the deterritorialised narrative of the Holocaust has come to act as a ‘kind of Western European 
civil religion’,119 though he does note that this “religion” does not fully apply to Eastern 
European contexts.120 Stone’s primary issue with cosmopolitan Holocaust memory and the SIF 
lies more in its capacity to overlook problematic areas of the national past, and promote a self-
serving and even insensitive narrative of the Holocaust. Stone highlights the fact that British 
national Holocaust consciousness was established far later than that of Germany and the United 
States. He contends that as a result, Holocaust memory has smoothly transitioned into national 
heritage, ‘bypassing a period of reflective or contested Vergangenheitsbewältigung’;121 by the 
term ‘heritage’, Stone refers to the result of a process of shaping past events into ‘myths that 
people want to hear about themselves and that can be nicely packaged and sold’.122 In the case 
of British Holocaust memory, this means a narrative that prioritises tales of rescue and victory 
in the war, while avoiding discussions of exclusionary foreign policy, domestic antisemitism, 
and a failure to intervene despite a widespread awareness of Hitler’s attacks on European Jews. 
As identified above in relation to twentieth-century Holocaust commemorations, this means 
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that Britain has been able to participate in efforts to construct a globalised metaphysical 
narrative of the Holocaust that positions contemporary society as the antithesis of Nazi brutality 
without undergoing any critical self-evaluation. Therefore, the proceedings of the SIF have 
‘contributed little to the reconfiguration of British national identity’123, and mean that ‘we have 
forgotten British history, the history of the Holocaust and, first and foremost, the dead’.124 
 
The Brexit Referendum 
Any realignment of British Holocaust memory in the twenty-first century towards 
Europeanised commemorative narratives seems all the more unlikely given the rise in 
Euroscepticism during the past decade. The roots of popular British Euroscepticism in the 
2010s can be identified in the responses to the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. This treaty sought to 
reorganise the European Union (EU)’s institutions following the introduction of several new 
member states. It laid out the role of EU member states, and prevented the vetoing of policies 
concerning climate change, emergency aid and energy security.125 Additionally, it outlined 
specific goals and values of EU member countries.126 The ostensible European values put 
forward in the Lisbon Treaty were constructed through a conflation of the founding principles 
of the EU with the aims of resistance movements active during the Second World War. This is 
evident in the statement that ‘by the early 1940s, movements of resistance of fascism and 
Nazism, elaborating their post-war strategies, were actively promoting the idea of European 
unification’.127 As such, the Lisbon Treaty constructs a moral authority grounded in a historical 
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tradition of resistance of totalitarianism and acceptance of difference. By extending the 
narrative of World War Two as conflict between absolute good and evil, this treaty legitimises 
present-day EU actions as a continuation of the fight against extremism.  
The creation of this legally-defined European identity was met with controversy across 
Europe, indicating a conflict between the EU’s political self-image, and the reception of its 
policies in different national contexts. In Britain, the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty saw the 
resurgence of debates concerning Britain’s membership of the EU. The Euroscepticism of 
many Britons, in particular amongst members of the Conservative Party, resulted in calls for a 
public referendum on Britain’s EU membership, which was eventually held in 2016.  
This referendum disrupted the projected pathway of a collective European approach to 
Holocaust remembrance and education. Contrary to predictions, the Leave campaign won the 
election with 51.9% of the vote compared to 48.1%128 for the Remain campaign, leading to 
David Cameron’s resignation. His successor, Theresa May, triggered Article 50 of the Lisbon 
Treaty which, it was intended, would see the UK leave the EU within two years. Since 2016, 
continuing clashes between voters, politicians and governments internationally have 
dominated the press, eventually causing May to resign in 2019. She was succeeded as Prime 
Minister by one of the principal architects of the Leave movement, Boris Johnson.  
During these tense Brexit debates, references to British actions in the Second World 
War have emerged as a powerful rhetorical device. In the run-up to the referendum. Boris 
Johnson referred to Hitler’s occupation of Europe, claiming that the EU was attempting to 
achieve the same ‘by different methods’129, and later announced that Brexit was ‘a chance for 
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British people to be the heroes of Europe and to act as a voice of moderation and common 
sense, and to stop something getting […] out of control’.130 Such statements epitomise the 
attitude of many Brexiteers, who concur with the narrative of Britain as the heroic nation in 
World War Two that had to singlehandedly save Europe. Another notable example of 
politicians utilising the history of World War Two can be seen in Theresa May’s 2019 
resignation speech, during which she referred to the efforts to evacuate Jewish children from 
Nazi Germany. May recalled her interactions with ‘the great humanitarian Sir Nicholas Winton 
– who saved the lives of hundreds of children […] through the Kindertransport’131 when 
addressing her successor. She recalled working with Winton as her constituent and learning 
from him the importance of compromise that she believed had assisted her throughout the 
Brexit process. This appears to be an effort to legitimise and justify her own actions as Prime 
Minister despite her failure to deliver Brexit. 
May’s choice to refer to the Kinderstransport in this context has been attacked by 
critics, including immigration and asylum barrister Colin Yeo. The Conservative government’s 
“hostile environment” following the Windrush Scandal, presaged by May’s attitude towards 
migrants and refuguees in the role of Home Secretary, led Yeo to denounce references to 
British actions in the Second World War as ‘blatant hypocrisy’.132 The hypocrisy of May’s 
statement can be further drawn out by the fact that, as London and Kushner have shown, the 
Kindertransport was not a government-led initiative that represents a rare moment of 
humanitarianism that contrasted with the overwhelmingly restrictive foreign policy, but was 
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rather the work of charitable institutions and individuals.  Politicians’ efforts to utilise the 
Second World War as a means to muster public support have been consistently undermined by 
both past and present-day political actions. As opposed to reflecting a genuine justification for 
Brexit, it is clear that allusions to the Second World War and the Holocaust were instead 
employed as a means to consolidate a British national identity that stands independently from 
the EU.  
 
 
Cases Studies of Twenty-First Century Holocaust Commemoration 
Existing studies of British Holocaust memory are beginning consider the ways in which 
national narratives have persisted in commemorative and pedagogical activity in spite of the 
ostensibly transnationalisation brought about after the SIF. Here, I expand this discussion by 
comparing iterations of HMD and the IWM’s permanent Holocaust exhibition developed prior 
to and following the Brexit referendum. From this analysis, it is not only apparent that post-
SIF Holocaust memory work continued to promote the existing twentieth century narratives of 
national heroism, but also that these have become more explicit in light of contemporary 
political shifts. This contention is then supported by an analysis of the memory narrative 
developed in the plans for the UKHMLC. An investigation into the intended form and function 
of this site reveals that the efforts to portray British past and present actions have become all 
the more explicit since the rejection of the EU signalled by the Brexit referendum.  
 
 
Imperial War Museum 
The idea for a national museum dedicated to recording British experiences of war was approved 
by the War Cabinet in 1917, when the First World War was still raging. It opened its doors to 
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the public in 1920, and aimed to record and present ‘the sacrifices of all sections of society’133 
in wartime. From its very beginning, then, it is clear that the boundaries between historical 
pedagogy and commemoration have been somewhat blurred at the IWM. This dual purpose 
calls to mind Williams’ analysis of memorial museums, which seek to ‘add both a moral 
framework to the narration of terrible historical events and more in-depth explanations to 
commemorative acts’.134 The IWM’s handling of the past is therefore structured around a moral 
framework based on the sacrifices made by British people in wars since the start of the 
twentieth century. From the outbreak of the Second World War, the museum began to collect 
and archive items representative of the ongoing war, and, since 1945, its scope has been further 
expanded to include all the Commonwealth conflicts. As well as the widening of its scope, the 
museum has also grown physically, and now has three branches in Duxford, Belfast and 
Trafford on top of the Churchill War Rooms.135 These sites are partly funded by the 
Government, but also rely on donations and sponsorship to maintain exhibitions and launch 
additional projects. 
Reflecting aforementioned political and social interest in the Nazi genocide during the 
1990s, work began on a permanent Holocaust exhibition at the IWM in 1996. The original 
Holocaust exhibition was spread across two floors and displayed ‘for the first time rare and 
important objects, some of them from former concentration and extermination camp museums 
in Germany, Poland and the Ukraine’.136 It was arranged chronologically, opening with an 
explanation of post-World War One political turmoil that ‘made a fertile seedbed for Hitler’s 
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anti-Jewish beliefs’137, and then tracing the persecution of European Jews using artefacts 
including photographs, propaganda posters and filmic evidence. In addition to viewing these 
artefacts, visitors were also able to ‘walk up to a wagon once heaved by slave labourers in a 
concentration camp’138, which had been donated to the IWM by Belgian Railways. Particularly 
interesting in this first version of the IWM’s Holocaust exhibition is its treatment of victims’ 
and survivors’ testimony. The experiences of those who suffered during the Nazi genocide is 
positioned in “contrast” to the ‘story of industrialised murder’139, in order to give a ‘fresh and 
haunting perspective to the narrative’.140 The emphasis on victims’ experiences is reflective of 
the museum’s overall purpose to represent the human impact of war.  
In his review of the IWM’s inaugural Holocaust Exhibition, Lawson praised the wealth 
of factual information provided in its presentation of the Nazi genocide. However, he argued 
that both the contents of the exhibition, and its location within the IWM were problematic in 
their reflection of British national understanding of the Nazi past. One of the key issues Lawson 
identifies was that the chronology revolved around a monocausal axis, meaning that 
antisemitism was posited as the explanation not only for the Nazis’ persecution of European 
Jews, but also for the Second World War as a whole.141 This effect was intensified by “sound 
leakage” between the various elements of the exhibition space; Lawson highlights the fact that 
when visitors are learning about pre-war Jewish life, the audio of hysterical Nazi speeches 
playing later in the space can already be heard.142 As a result, the Nazis are ‘explained only 
with reference to maniacal antisemitism and ideology’143, preventing an understanding of the 
genocide as human event rather than an abstract metaphor of good and evil. 
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The portrayal of the Holocaust in such simplistic, metaphysical terms is not only an 
issue because it misrepresents the realities of the Third Reich; it is also troublesome because 
of its positive national inflection. The exhibition did contain some mention of Britain’s 
exclusionary foreign policy and failure to intervene as news of the Nazis’ persecution of the 
Jews reached Britain. Yet, Lawson indicates that the overarching presentation of Nazism in 
dualistic terms of good and evil meant that ‘comfort [could] be sought in the differences 
between liberal democracy and Nazism – the former may have shortcomings and may have 
made the wrong decisions, but the latter was evil incarnate’.144 As such, visitors did not need 
to reflect on their own attitudes or national history because, compared with the depravity of the 
Holocaust as a distant event carried out by the inhuman Nazis, Britain was a morally superior 
nation.145 This effect was only heightened by the exhibition’s inclusion within the IWM, an 
institution that is inextricable from a narrative of British historic and present day military 
strength and noble sacrifice. The emphasis on victims’ experiences within the broader setting 
of the IWM results in an uncomfortable conflation of those who were murdered in the 
Holocaust with British loss of life in military conflicts. As a result, British visitors understood 
suffering of Jews in the Holocaust within a framework of national military sacrifice, further 
limiting the capacity for in-depth national- and self-reflection.   
More recent studies that follow Levy and Sznaider’s analysis of twenty-first century 
European commemorative practice consider the ways in which the IWM’s presentation of the 
Holocaust relates to the handling of other genocidal atrocities. In her comparison of the 
permanent Holocaust Exhibition with the more recent Crimes Against Humanity (CAH) 
Exhibition, which was positioned alongside the Holocaust exhibition in 2009, Jinks argues that 
the Holocaust is presented as ‘an anchor’ for further case studies of genocide, ‘placing them 
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on its spectrum rather than marking out the Holocaust as a category all of its own’.146 This 
reinforces a metaphysical understanding of the Nazi genocide, divorcing it from its historical 
context and establishing it as a source of eternal, though perhaps undefined, moral lessons. As 
a result, individuals recognise the contemporary relevance of the Holocaust and reflect on 
ongoing global injustices without being prompted to ask more complex questions of British 
responses to the Holocaust and subsequent atrocities.147 Representations of the Holocaust can 
therefore determine the ways in which Britons engage with other genocides without 
undermining an ostensible historic tradition of national moral superiority.  
Jinks’ relation of the Holocaust Exhibition to the more general CAH Exhibition 
provides a useful analytical example for a further examination of the Holocaust Exhibition’s 
position within the broader context of the IWM. For the most part, the IWM is arranged 
chronologically, opening with the First World War Galleries and ending with the Lord Ashcroft 
Gallery, which presents examples of British military heroism.148 The Holocaust is the exception 
to this timeline, and is physically separated from the otherwise chronological structure of the 
museum by a series of temporary exhibitions. Similarly, of the guidebook’s sixty pages, the 
Holocaust takes up just three. This separation is justified by the argument that ‘the [Holocaust] 
exhibition is not recommended for children under 14.’149 However, it also has the effect of 
removing the Nazi genocide from the standard historical narrative, reinforcing its metaphysical 
presentation as an event that transcends history and remains relevant to the present day.  
Separating the Holocaust from the history of the Second World War facilitates a self-
aggrandising and often nostalgic representation of wartime Britain. The Second World War 
itself is also divided into two subsections in the IWM: A Family in Wartime and Turning Points 
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1934-1945. Both of these collections are housed on the first floor of the museum. A Family in 
Wartime focuses on the British experience of the war, displaying artefacts such as ration books 
and propaganda posters. There is also a reconstruction of a 1940s home, depicting the fashions 
and lifestyles of the period. Turning Points: 1934-1945 predominantly deals with the military 
aspects of the Second World War. This includes a timeline of key events in warfare and the 
machinery used, including submarines and weapons. Between these two collections, there is 
no explicit description of the antisemitic policies integral to Nazism. Britain’s involvement in 
the war is explained in the vague statement that ‘Britain’s safety and basic values felt threatened 
as dictators and extremist nationalists emerged’. 150 The true nature of these nationalist regimes 
is not explicated, with the only mention of victims being the statement that ‘as Hitler’s power 
grew, some Germans began to flee abroad’. 151 This ambiguity enables a generally positive 
depiction of Britain’s involvement in the war that prioritises moments of heroism and triumph. 
This, in addition to the reference to the familiar political motif “British Values” aligns the 
exhibitions with the heroic narrative of the Second World War promoted by the Conservative 
government since 2014; the motif of “British values” in contemporary British Holocaust 
remembrance will be revisited in greater detail below in reference to the plans for a new 
national Holocaust memorial.  
 Furthermore, the immersive quality of the Holocaust exhibition helps to promote a 
positive reflection on contemporary British society and structures. This is all the more pertinent 
in the 2010s, as national politics have veered away from European co-operation and has 
become increasingly isolationist. As the timeline of the Holocaust exhibition progresses, 
visitors are increasingly isolated from the rest of the museum. When moving through the 
exhibition, the use of colour is gradually phased out until it is entirely black, white and grey, 
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and there is no natural daylight. This sensory deprivation submerges viewers in the history of 
the Holocaust and simultaneously provokes a sense of disorientation and claustrophobia. This 
culminates with the white scale-model of Auschwitz, shown next to a pile of shoes evoking the 
images of those taken from victims as they entered the camp, and the uniforms they were forced 
to wear. The final part of the exhibition concerns the liberation of concentration camps as well 
as the trials of Nazi officials. This section is displayed with natural textures, such as wooden 
tables, and is brightly lit, contrasting with the darkness elsewhere. Finally, visitors re-enter the 
main foyer of the IWM.  
As I discuss below in relation to the proposed UKHMLC, the immersive quality of the 
exhibition and deliberate contrasting with modern society evokes Alba’s concept of the 
negative epiphany. This is a process by which a traumatic past event is deliberately contrasted 
with a positive image of modern society in order to create a renewed appreciation for the 
present-day systems and structures.152 There is a palpable sense of relief when exiting the 
claustrophobic, manmade environment of the exhibition to the natural, well-lit information 
centre. The visceral effect of this is further heightened by the fact that the exhibition closes 
with the liberation of concentration camps and the prosecution of high profile Nazi criminals. 
In the summary of the Holocaust exhibition available on the IWM’s website, one of the two 
featured aspects of the memorial is a rag doll given to a British soldier by a prisoner of Belsen 
as a ‘token of gratitude’ for liberating the camp.153 This, and other artefacts with a similar 
background, help to conclude the exhibition space with a redemptive narrative for British 
visitors based on the moment of liberation, harking back to that initial political, prosthetic 
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memory of the Holocaust that was established at the end of the war and consolidated throughout 
the twentieth century.  
From this analysis, it is evident that the presentation of the Holocaust at the IWM 
mirrors broader metaphysical narratives of British national heroism in spite of the apparent 
transnationalisation of Holocaust memory. At present, the Holocaust exhibition is undergoing 
significant renovations, which will change the artefacts on display as well as reconfiguring the 
museum space itself. It will be interesting to see whether this rejuvenation of the IWM’s 
permanent Holocaust exhibition will see it move further in line with the political memory of 
the Holocaust emerging in the 2010s, or whether the European commemoration projects of the 
early 2000s will take effect and result in the embodiment of a cosmopolitan, Europeanised 
narrative of the Third Reich.  
 
Holocaust Memorial Day 2005 and 2016 
As construction on the IWM’s Holocaust Exhibition was underway in the late 1990s, British 
politicians also began to consider the creation of a day of remembrance for the Holocaust. 
These plans were formalised during the SIF and included as the sixth point of the Stockholm 
Declaration, which states that IHRA member states will ‘encourage appropriate forms of 
Holocaust remembrance, including an annual Day of Holocaust Remembrance, in our own 
countries’.154 27 January, the anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz, was designated as 
HMD with its primary aim being to ‘commemorate the victims of the Holocaust and to honour 
those who stood against it’.155 For the first four years, HMD in the UK was co-ordinated and 
organised by the Home Office with local authorities taking responsibility for the events held in 
their area. In 2005, Home Secretary Charles Clarke established the Holocaust Memorial Day 
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Trust (HMDT) and appointed a board of trustees who would take on the responsibility for 
conducting HMD in Britain. The content of each year’s HMD is shaped by an overarching 
theme devised by the HMDT. The purpose of declaring a specific theme is to help organisers 
develop ‘fresh ideas for interesting and inspiring commemorations’.156 Since its initial proposal 
in the Stockholm Declaration, the scope of HMD has been expanded to include not only those 
murdered by the Nazis, but also the victims of genocides in Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia and 
Darfur.157   
 Superficially, the integration of HMD into the British national calendar appears to 
represent the consolidation of a globalised Holocaust memory in Britain. Not only is HMD one 
of the main events set out by the Stockholm Declaration, it is also observed on the same day 
each year by countries all around the world. Yet, in his analysis of the first HMD held in 2001, 
Pearce argued that the event continued to be inseparable from the post-war historical, 
sociocultural and political developments with the UK’158 that contributed to the particularities 
of British understandings of the Holocaust. Pearce largely attributes the intense politicisation 
of the day to the pervasive motif of “lessons” – a rhetorical device also evident in the HMD’s 
Statements of Commitment, which state that ‘we will do our utmost to ensure that the lessons 
of such events are fully learnt’.159 Because the importance of taking specific lessons about the 
heights of good in humanity and the depths of evil, the narrative of HMD became unassailable, 
with critics being accused of antisemitism or xenophobia.160 This is problematic, as the course 
of HMD in 2001 was determined at a governmental level, meaning that the ostensibly 
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indisputable lessons being imparted were devised by a political body. As such, the 
representation of the Holocaust itself hinged on pre-existing political narratives which, as we 
have seen, tend to prioritise positive actions such as the liberation to avoid criticisms of wartime 
foreign policy. Therefore, the first HMD promoted a political memory that ‘not only diluted 
Britain’s historical relation to the Holocaust but also entailed the effacement of Britain’s own 
national history of imperialism, discrimination and persecution’.161 Pearce concludes his 
analysis of the 2001 HMD by pondering whether subsequent HMD events would continue to 
perpetuate positive national narratives, or if they have incorporated elements of self-criticism. 
He questions 
whether the passage of subsequent HMD’s since 2001 together with 20 years of 
Holocaust education has managed to rectify this [self-preserving British 
narrative], or whether a widespread “critical” Holocaust consciousness in 
Britain remains elusive.162 
 
Here, I compare the ceremonies held in 2005 and 2016 in order to determine the degree to 
which HMD perpetuated pre-SIF British understandings of the Holocaust. I structure this 
analysis around the four “metafunctions” of remembrance ceremonies identified by John E 
Richardson. These metafunctions serve the following purposes: ‘to Communicate History; to 
Communicate Values; to Communicate Solemnity; and to Communicate Hope’.163 They do not 
operate independently, but interact to convey a narrative of the Holocaust that emphasises its 
seriousness and impact for the present day, while simultaneously, though perhaps somewhat 
contradictorily, also conveying a message of hope for the future.164 The intersections between 
these four metafunctions create a framework on which an analysis of the rhetorical devices 
employed during HMD commemorations can be based. The resulting interpretation can, in 
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turn, be related to broader questions levelled at the legitimacy of viewing the Holocaust in the 
twenty-first century as a cosmopolitan or transnational memory. 
HMD 2005 is a particularly interesting case study for two key reasons. Firstly, because 
it was the first HMD to be organised not by the Home Office, but by the newly established 
HMDT. The transferral of the event from the direct responsibility of the Government to an 
ostensibly independent charitable trust suggests that there may be a realignment of its approach 
to conducting the event. Secondly, because it was held on the 60 anniversary of the liberation 
of Auschwitz, thus garnering an exceptional degree of public interest. Whereas HMD 2005 
was a significant television event, HMD 2016 countered the upward trend in airtime dedicated 
to the event seen since 2011. This is not unexpected, however, given the fact that 2015 saw a 
dramatic increase in Holocaust memorial programming to mark to seventieth anniversary of 
the liberation of Auschwitz and the end of World War Two. In spite of the reduced media 
coverage of the event, HMD 2016 is an important case study, as it was held a year after the 
state took on a more central role in Holocaust commemoration, signalled by the publication of 
Britain’s Promise to Remember, and in the same year as the Brexit Referendum.  
 The events of HMD 2005 were based around the theme “Survivors, Liberation and 
Rebuilding Lives” In the “Theme Paper” announcing the title of the 2005 HMD, the historian 
David Cesarani called for Holocaust survivors to become role models, replacing the current 
vapid celebrity culture.165 Part of the inspiration that, according to Cesarani, can be derived 
from the experiences of survivors and liberators is their resilience to ignorance and even 
aggressions after emigration to Britain. He argues that in spite of direct threats from figures 
such as Oswald Mosely, and in light of post-war policymaking that denied refugees entry to 
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Britain, the survivors ‘never clamoured to be heard and did not want attention’.166 Cesarani’s 
suggestions in the Theme Paper appear to encourage a more critical engagement with Britain’s 
role in the war. Similarly, the theme of the 2016 event was “Don’t Stand By”, building on the 
work conducted the previous year by ‘focusing on the contemporary relevance of the Holocaust 
and subsequent genocides, and considering our individual responsibilities not to be bystanders 
to hate crime and prejudice’.167 The key areas of focus recommended in the Theme Paper 
included Bystanders, Rescuers, and Resistance and Challenge. Interestingly the report also 
asks: did Britain stand by?168 Referencing the research presented in Britain’s Promise to 
Remember, the Theme Paper recognises ‘British flirtations with fascism, the UK’s refusal to 
accept significant levels of Jewish emigration’169 and ‘the seeming failure to make any special 
effort to disrupt the extermination’.170 Moreover, the Paper highlights the fact that Britain’s 
military opposition to Nazi Germany was not intended as a means to rescue European Jews.171  
From the guidance offered in these papers, it seemed promising that HMD 2005 and 
2016 may have helped to promote a self-critical national narrative of the Nazi genocide. 
However, as shown in the analysis presented below, it becomes clear that this apparent effort 
to develop a more nuanced narrative of British wartime actions did not translate into the 
televised versions of the event. Instead, HMD 2005 and 2016 both, in different ways, adhered 
to the pre-existing metaphysical narrative of British heroism that have dominated national 
discourse since 1945.  This follows the same pattern identified above in relation to the National 
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Curriculum, where academic discussion has become more nuanced and critical, but public 
implementation has not. 
HMD 2005 was held in Westminster Hall, a location typically reserved for significant 
national events including Jubilee celebrations and state funerals. The programme opened with 
narrator James Naughtie announcing the arrival of the Queen and Prince Phillip, which was 
timed to match the exact moment of the liberation of Auschwitz.172 They entered the Hall to a 
congregation of six hundred Holocaust survivors and their families, around forty liberators, 
and numerous politicians, British Jewish leaders and cultural figures. Several recognisable 
members of British culture participated, including actor Christopher Ecclestone, Paralympian 
Ade Adepitan, comedian Stephen Fry and football manager Sven-Görran Eriksson, as well as 
Prime Minister Tony Blair and Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks.   
The ceremony itself was made up of several speeches, readings, poems and musical 
elements, which were interspersed with a four-part video following Holocaust survivor Susan 
Pollack’s first return to Belsen concentration camp after its liberation in 1945. Upon Pollack’s 
arrival at Belsen, she met Major Dick Williams who was amongst the troops that liberated the 
camp. Together, they lit a candle that was then taken and preserved by Royal Scots Dragoon 
Guards (RSDG) and transported to London. At this point, Naughtie noted that the RSDG’s 
‘predecessors fought to liberate Europe sixty years ago’ (40m30s).173 An extract of Anne 
Frank’s diary was then read by actor and author Imogen Stubbs, followed by a speech from 
Frank’s childhood friend Hannah Goslar. In her recounting of pre-war memories of their 
friendship, Goslar re-humanised Frank, reminding audiences that ‘before she became an 
international symbol of the Holocaust she was my childhood friend’ (13m40s-13m46s).174 Her 
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account was followed by an extract from Oratorium Annelies, a musical composition written 
in Frank’s memory by British composer James Whitbourn.175 The ceremony concluded with 
the lighting of sixty candles, one for each year since the liberation of Auschwitz, using the 
flame lit at Belsen by Pollack and Williams. The candle-lighting was also accompanied by an 
orchestral arrangement of Oratorium Annelies. Naughtie’s closing statement reminds viewers 
that ‘genocide did not end with the Nazis’ (59m15s).176 
In terms of its overall structure, the 2016 ceremony broadly mirrored that of the 2005 
event, but the cultural figures involved in the event and its location suggest that it attracted far 
less political attention. HMD 2016 was held at Guildhall, a location associated with political 
events as opposed having the revered status of Westminster Hall. The ceremony was largely 
conducted by the actor Robert Lindsay, with contributions from fellow actors Emilia Fox, 
Freddie Fox, Kevin Whately and Dame Kristin Scott Thomas as well as Chief Rabbi Ephraim 
Mirvis and historian David Olusoga. The televised version of the event was narrated by 
newsreader and television presenter Mishal Husain. A variety of film clips were integrated into 
the event, including Olusoga’s historical explanation of the Nazi persecution of European Jews, 
two survivors’ story of their escape to Britain, and the testimony of a young woman’s 
experience of violence in Darfur. The 2016 event also ended with a candle lighting ceremony, 
during which six large candles on plinths bearing the names of Nazi concentration camps 
alongside those of contemporary sites of genocide were lit as violinist Jennifer Pike performed 
the Theme of Schindler’s List. Finally, the choir of Clare College Cambridge performed 





may live up to the promises of Never Again and thus truly learn from this dark chapter in our 
history’ (1hr00m40s-1hr00m50s).177 
Holocaust survivor Susan Pollack’s eyewitness testimony and return to Belsen can be 
understood as the historical metafunction of HMD 2005. Pollack’s suffering in childhood was 
contrasted with her adult life in Britain, following existing tendencies to contrast the horrors 
of Belsen with notions of British national heroism. The symbolism of Belsen in the British 
memoryscape was reiterated by Pollack’s encounter with Major Williams upon arriving at the 
site, a meeting that appears to have been arranged without Pollack’s prior knowledge. Her 
gratitude to soldiers, such as Major Williams, was expressed in the statement ‘I have an 
idealised vision of the liberators […] as heroes, as someone who had some answer to our needs 
in the midst of such evil’ (36m15s-36m26s).178 As opposed to revealing a new aspect about the 
experiences of life in Belsen or the challenges of post-war life, the historical function of HMD 
2005 instead mirrored existing narratives of Britain’s military actions in the final weeks of the 
war. As such, a historical narrative was presented that reinforced the existing British 
connection of the Holocaust to Belsen – this is in spite of the fact that HMD is intentionally 
held on the anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz. 
Similarly, the communication of history during the 2016 HMD was achieved primarily 
through two embedded video clips of historian Olusoga’s visit to Belsen concentration camps. 
These two videos outlined the development and encouragement of antisemitism in Nazi 
Germany from 1933, up to the discovery of the genocide by British troops in 1945. The choice 
of Olusoga– a historian best known for his work to bring greater awareness to Britain’s history 
of racial discrimination – to present these videos added a new dimension to the narrative of the 
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Holocaust presented during HMD 2016. In line with the wider efforts to connect the history of 
the Holocaust to subsequent genocides during the 2016 ceremony, Olusoga’s involvement 
implied that a link was also being drawn between British historical and present-day racism and 
the antisemitism of Nazi ideology. The symbolic importance of Belsen is indicated in the 
statement that ‘too much had happened on this spot for it to ever be anything other than a 
warning of what lies within us and what can happen if we’re not watchful’ (9m08s-9m19s).179 
This statement is again particularly charged given Olusoga’s eminence as a historian dedicated 
to exposing Britain’s historical and continued oppression of black people; is the “us” he refers 
to humanity in general, those who exhibit prejudiced behaviours, or those who may fall victim 
to such attitudes?  This historical report of what happened in Belsen was then re-embedded 
within the British context in a speech by Susan Pollack, who, as in 2005, relayed her experience 
of Nazi persecution and post-war effort to rebuild her life in Britain. The historic metafunction 
of HMD 2016 continued to take the liberation of Belsen as a symbolic representation of both 
suffering and heroism in the Second World War. There was also an implicit extension of 
existing representations of Belsen as a representative of the triumph of good over evil to a 
broader discussion of British national history, somewhat fulfilling the recommendations made 
in the event’s Theme Paper. 
The value metafunction of 2005 not only stemmed from the interaction between the 
heroic figure of Major Williams, but can be identified in Prime Minister Tony Blair’s speech, 
during which he asserts that HMD ‘teaches us a lesson of remembrance. We must never forget 
the victims and we must never dishonour their memory by allowing the ugly poison of racial 
prejudice and hatred to hold sway again’ (51m30s-51m49s). The imperative to remember was 




hearts we allow the dead to live again’ (52m05s).180 By this reasoning, not only does Holocaust 
commemoration enable us to pay respect to those who died, but it also serves as a form of 
resurrection, symbolically giving victims a final victory over the Nazis who tried to eradicate 
them that is facilitated by British willingness to remember.  
The 2016 ceremony presented a set of moral values that were even more closely 
intertwined with British identity through the profile of Major Frank Foley. An MI6 Agent and 
diplomat working in Berlin, Foley was able to save the lives of around ten thousand Jewish 
people by breaking Nazi and British laws to issue false papers, visas and passports.181 The story 
of his rescue effort was relayed by Lindsay, and then a video clip was shown of Judy Field and 
Werner Lachs who were both able to escape Nazi Germany thanks to Foley. In this clip, Lachs 
states: ‘as far as I’m concerned, Frank Foley is my saviour and my saint’ (21m20s-21m24s).182 
Lindsay emphasised Foley’s inspirational role for future generations in his statement that ‘not 
everyone can be a Frank Foley’ (21m30-21m47s), but that individuals should do what they can 
to stand up to hatred. Undoubtedly, Foley showed great courage in his acts of defiance against 
Nazi policies, which easily could have seen him killed. What was not mentioned in this account 
of his actions, however, is the fact that providing Jews with false papers also contravened 
British wartime immigration policy. Omitting this fact enables Foley to be presented as a 
national role model without evoking a critical discussion of the British government’s wartime 
policy and practice, recalling the reference to Winton made in May’s resignation speech as 
outlined above.  
Furthermore, the editing of the televised ceremony removed elements that would 
otherwise have prompted the more nuanced engagement with British Holocaust narratives 
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encouraged in the 2016 Theme Paper. This is particularly evident in Chief Rabbi Ephraim 
Mirvis’ speech titled ‘No Ifs, No Buts’ (40m18-43m49s).183 In the version of the speech that 
was broadcast, Mirvis denounces individuals’ silence in the face of hatred and inequality. He 
points to missed opportunities to stop the Nazis, such as Weimar Germany’s electorate’s lack 
of faith in democracy, silence in the face of mounting antisemitism in post-1933 Germany, and 
the unquestioning obedience of Zyklon B factory workers.184 At 41m58s, there is a quite 
obvious cut in the footage. The speech transcript published by the Office of the Chief Rabbi 
reveals that at this point in his speech, Mirvis had declared that ‘if the Allied forces had decided 
to bomb the railway lines into Auschwitz-Birkenau when they first received detailed 
information about the camp in June of 1944, who knows how many lives could have been 
saved?’185 Of course, the editing of the ceremony in and of itself is not problematic; the 
programme had to fit in within the BBC scheduling. However, the decision to remove this 
element of Mirvis’ speech over other elements, such as the presentation of Frank Foley, 
indicates that while the ceremony itself may have contained nationally critical elements, the 
version portrayed to the vast majority of Britons aligned national values with longstanding and 
unassailable narratives of heroism.  
Connected to both the functions of communicating history and values is the 
communication of solemnity. As Richardson highlights, ‘the history of genocide and our values 
needs to be presented in such a way that emphasises their gravity’.186 There is no doubt that 
HMD 2005 was presented as a solemn, formal event during which attendees paid respect to the 
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gravity of the subject matter, this sense of solemnity was created by the recognisable 
participants in the ceremony as well as its location. Most notably, the opening of the event by 
the British monarchy immediately conveyed both the seriousness of the ceremony, and its 
importance to Britain’s national self-understanding.  Solemnity is also conveyed during the 
lighting of sixty candles, one for each year since the liberation of Auschwitz, using the flame 
lit at Belsen by Pollack and Williams. The first two candles were lit by the Queen and Prince 
Phillip, and the remaining fifty-eight by Holocaust survivors. Given its accompaniment by 
Whitbourn’s Oratorium Annalies, this act embedded a symbolic act of Holocaust remembrance 
within the narrative of the liberation of Belsen and the Diary of Anne Frank – both of which 
reflect a particular British engagement with the Nazi genocide.  
The solemnity of HMD 2016 was conveyed through repeated references to the 
genocides in Bosnia, Rwanda, Cambodia and Darfur. In this iteration of the event, these further 
genocides were not presented abstractly, but made up the majority of the second half of the 
ceremony. For example, Mirvis’ speech called for self-reflection amongst contemporary 
audiences, arguing that a greater commitment to the lessons of the Holocaust and to the notion 
of “Never Again” could have prevented more recent genocides in Bosnia, Cambodia, Darfur 
and Rwanda (42m22s).187. The 2016 event also featured a symbolic lighting of candles, led by 
Holocaust survivors alongside survivors of subsequent genocides. Six large candles were 
placed on plinths bearing the names of Nazi concentration camps alongside those of 
contemporary sites of genocide were lit as violinist Jennifer Pike performs the Theme from the 
film Schindler’s List. Just as in the 2005 ceremony, this act framed the Holocaust 
commemoration using a recognisable cultural retelling of the Nazi past as well as contemporary 
events. As such, the seriousness of Holocaust commemoration was embedded within a 
perception that, had previous generations shown greater commitment to the ostensible 
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“lessons” of the Holocaust, then future genocides could have been prevented. This notion 
added greater weight and importance to the act of remembering the Holocaust. 
The final metafunction delineated by Richardson is the communication of hope. This 
element is more complex, for in a ceremony ‘with too great an emphasis on hope, the solemnity 
of the whole occasion can be undermined’.188 In HMD 2005, hope, that is to say the sense that 
‘we are not defined by this catastrophic past’189, was epitomised by Eriksson’s statement that 
‘the fact that stories of hope can survive even in Auschwitz should be an inspiration to us all’ 
(39m27s-39m35s).190 This statement restated the depravity of Auschwitz, but also provided a 
redemptive arc for humanity in the fact that some kind of hope could survive, even there. 
Additionally, Pollack’s memory of the liberation of Belsen helped to position British troops as 
a symbol of hope in a period of despair. The same idea was built upon by Tony Blair in his 
declaration that HMD ‘lets us with humility remember some of the extraordinary acts of 
courage by Jewish people and others during the Holocaust’ (50m50s-50m57s).191 Not only was 
Britain in the 2000s distanced from the horrors of the Nazi genocide, it is positioned as the 
antithesis of them.  
HMD 2016 ended with the choir of Clare College Cambridge performing A Song of 
Hope by Howard Goodall. According to Richardson, the positioning of this song at the end of 
the programme offered an ‘uplifting vocal refrain’192 that motivated audiences to actively 
change their behaviour so that positive changes may ‘be noticeable at some distant time in the 
future’.193 The message of hope put forward in the 2016 ceremony therefore echoed broader 
memory work being carried out in Britain, in which learning about and remembering the 
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Holocaust was positioned as a way to protect against future injustices. As highlighted by the 
reference to subsequent genocides, the way in which this work was conducted needs 
realignment in order to be truly effective. Therefore, the renewed financial investment and 
political energy being poured into Holocaust remembrance was legitimised by the notion that 
previous work has left the task of “Never Again” unfulfilled.   
An analysis of both HMD 2005 and HMD 2016 using Richardson’s metafunctions 
reveals that, on the whole, their ultimate manifestation did not reflect the encouragingly self-
evaluative approach outlined in each year’s Theme Paper. The various ways in which the 
Holocaust is represented and commemorated in these national commemoration services 
consolidates the same rhetoric of unassailable British national heroism versus the ultimate evil 
of the Holocaust. Thus, the influence of the IHRA on British remembrance in the years 
immediately succeeding the SIF did not, as Pearce hoped, lead to re-evaluation of dominant 
narratives of the past.  HMD 2016 is admittedly a more complex event than HMD 2005 in 
terms of its connections to broader political issues and its status within the British national 
calendar. Whereas the 2005 event received extensive airtime and drew in significant audiences 
– attributable to the fact it was held on the sixtieth anniversary of liberation – there was no 
political presence at HMD 2016, and the cultural figures involved generally have a lower 
national and international profile. Additionally, by HMD 2016, the HMDT at been established 
for over a decade, therefore suggesting more autonomy and independence than in the 2005 
event. As a result, it appears that the contents of the ceremony were able to include more critical 
elements, indicated by the references to subsequent genocides and the questioning of past 
actions. The critical aspect of HMD 2016 is also signalled by the presentation of the historical 
narrative by Olusoga, connecting his research into British anti-black racism to the existing 
metaphysical understanding of Belsen.  Yet, as has been shown by the editing of Mirvis’ 
speech, the version of the ceremony presented to British audiences had had the more explicitly 
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critical elements removed. Thus, while independent organisations may have been seeking to 
present a more critical version of events, the mainstream engagement with the Nazi genocide 
was explicitly shaped around heroic figures, such as Frank Foley, and politically inflected, if 
largely undefined, “lessons”. 
 
UKHMLC and Britain’s Promise to Remember  
The lack of a political presence in the 2016 HMD ceremony is all the more surprising given 
the extensive research being carried out into Holocaust education and remembrance by the 
British government that year. Such research was conducted in a political climate that was 
increasingly centring on debates about Britain’s EU-membership, indicating an effort amongst 
politicians to express the same level of commitment to remembering the Holocaust as was 
being shown by the EU. In 2013, at a dinner celebrating the 25th anniversary of the HET, 
Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron first announced the establishment of a Holocaust 
Commission assembled by head of the Jewish Leadership Council Mick Davis. According to 
Cameron’s speech, the decision to create this Commission was prompted not only by a desire 
to continue the work of the HET, but also by a need for Holocaust memory to encourage 
individuals to counter ongoing violence and intolerance.194 Cameron referred to recent 
genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica, to the war in Syria and treatment of refugees, and to the 
use of chemical weapons threatening Israel as evidence of a greater need to learn about the 
Holocaust.195 In the speech’s conclusion, Cameron reinforced the specific national 
commitment to remembering the Holocaust, stating: 
I believe that remembering for the future is vital for us all. When I visited Yad 
Vashem in 2006 I wrote that “We owe it to those who died – and those who 
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survived – to build a world in which this can never happen again.” That is my 
pledge. That is why Britain will remember. That is why Britain will never stand 
by. And that is why I stand here as Prime Minister and say to the survivors here 
tonight: the past will never die and your courage will never be forgotten.196 
 
As will be seen, the emphasis on Britain in this statement sums up the approach taken to 
Holocaust commemoration and education projects produced by the government in the 
following years. 
The task of the Holocaust Commission announced in this speech was to ‘investigate 
what more needs to be done to ensure Britain has a permanent and fitting memorial and the 
educational resources needed for generations to come.’197 The group was made up of 
politicians, public figures, businesspeople and leading members of the British Jewish 
community. Members included actor Helena Bonham-Carter, broadcaster Natasha Kaplinsky, 
Arts Council Chair Sir Peter Bazalgette, politicians Michael Gove, Ed Balls and Simon 
Hughes, and Chief Rabbi Ephraim Mirvis. On HMD 2015, exactly a year after the creation of 
this commission, Cameron presented a document titled Britain’s Promise to Remember: The 
Prime Minister’s Holocaust Commission Report. The result of a year’s worth of research into 
Holocaust education and commemoration in Britain, this report put forward four suggestions 
to improve Britons’ knowledge and awareness of the Nazi genocide. They recommended 
greater financial investment in educational projects, a programme to record British Holocaust 
survivors’ and liberators’ testimonies, the development of a Learning Centre tasked with 
promoting national Holocaust education that takes advantage of new technologies, and the 
creation of a national Holocaust memorial site.198  
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Echoing the language used by Cameron in his 2013 speech, Britain’s Promise to 
Remember emphasises the centrality of Holocaust remembrance to British national self-
understanding. In its introduction, the report states ‘ensuring that the memory and the lessons 
of the Holocaust are never forgotten lies at the heart of Britain’s values as a nation’199, a claim 
which is justified by the war effort against Hitler as well as the rescue of 10,000 Jewish children 
in the Kindertransport. The concept of “values” unique to Britain is a recurrent motif 
throughout the document: the actions of Britons who saved Jewish refugees are attributed to 
their ‘strong belief in British values’200; Ian Austin MP writes ‘it is Britain’s unique response 
to the Holocaust and its unique role in the war that gives us the right to claim a particular 
attachment to the values of democracy, equality, freedom and fairness’201; and the new 
memorial is intended to ‘stand as a permanent affirmation of the values of British society’202.  
As a result of its emphasis on British national actions and values, the narrative of the 
Holocaust established in Britain’s Promise to Remember and the plans for the UKHMLC 
undermined the Lisbon Treaty’s depiction of the EU the fulfilment of Nazi resistance fighters’ 
hopes for the future. The authors defined the Holocaust as ‘the product of a thousand years of 
European antisemitism’203, and stated that ‘not long ago, and not far from where we live, 
ordinary people across [continental] Europe became complicit in the murder of their 
neighbours’.204 This is contrasted with the depiction of Britain as the sole country that 
‘soldiered on, against all odds’205 to defeat the evils of Nazism. The contrasting of British and 
European wartime actions suggests that the political rupture with EU structures has bled into 
subsequent Holocaust memorial work. 
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The focus on British national political identity is further evident in the choice of 
location for the new memorial. In 2016, it was decided that the most appropriate site for the 
UKHMLC was Victoria Tower Gardens, a small park adjacent to the Houses of Parliament. 
According to a 2016 press release, this use of this site is advantageous because ‘when children 
come to Parliament and learn about the history of our great democracy, they will also be able 
to learn about and remember what happened when racism, antisemitism and hatred was left 
unchecked and allowed to flourish’.206 It is worth noting that this is almost the same location 
as the Jewel House Gardens that were rejected by Heseltine in 1983 for the Hyde Park 
Memorial apparently because it was considered ‘one of the few remaining sites close to the 
Palace of Westminster which might provide a location for a Parliamentary or State memorial 
in the future’.207 The reversal of the official stance on the use of this space in itself indicates a 
dramatic transformation of the status of Holocaust memory in British political settings. 
Whereas Heseltine perceived a Holocaust memorial as a matter of little relevance to British 
national identity, twenty-first century commemorative activity has deliberately positioned 
Holocaust memory within a network of national political sites. As a result, it is clear that a 
particular British political memory of the Holocaust has taken precedence over private 
commemorative work since the 1980s. 
In 2016, a competition was launched to determine the design of the new memorial. 
According to the competition brief, entrants were to create ‘an outstanding and sensitively-
designed Memorial and Learning Centre that is emotionally powerful while offering visitors 
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an opportunity to deepen their understanding of humanity’s darkest hour’.208 Of the ninety-two 
initial entrants to the competition, ten were chosen to further develop their proposals in 2017.209 
In October 2017, Adjaye Associates, Ron Arad Architects and Gustafson Porter + Bowman’s 
collaborative design was unanimously voted the winner of the competition. Their concept is 
made up of an over-ground memorial comprised of twenty-three bronze fins, which create 
twenty-two pathways down into an underground learning centre. The pathways represent that 
twenty-two countries in which Jewish communities were destroyed during the Holocaust.210 
Entering the memorial via these pathways is intended to be a sensory experience, isolating 
visitors and leading them to engage with the memorial and learning centre on a personal level. 
The pathways lead into an area named “The Threshold”, representing the transition from the 
external memorial to the internal Learning Centre. Inside, the designers proposed the creation 
of a “Hall of Testimonies” where survivors’ eyewitness accounts are displayed digitally, and 
“Contemplation Court” with eight bronze panels.211 Upon leaving the memorial, visitors are 
confronted with a ‘classic uninterrupted view of Parliament – and the reality of democracy’212, 
deliberately contrasting the horrors of the Holocaust with the image of twenty-first century 
British political structures. Enabling visitors to end their visit with a view of Parliament is a 
central element of the overall memorial’s impact. 
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The dual purpose of the UKHMLC as both a Holocaust memorial and an education 
centre evokes Williams’ discussion of memorial museums. The intention of teaching visitors 
about the Nazi genocide is not only to ensure an in-depth historical understanding and 
awareness of the continued implications of the Holocaust for contemporary international 
relations and political structures. It is also to encourage visitors to consider their own behaviour 
and interpersonal relationships, meaning that the UKHMLC performs as a site of moral 
renewal. Not only does the museum seek to lead visitors to reflect on their own lives, but it 
also casts contemporary political structures in a positive light. David Tollerton has interpreted 
the intentional positioning of the UKHMLC alongside Parliament using Alba’s concept of 
“negative epiphany”.213 By intentionally guiding visitors through an underground and 
immersive space, the designers hope to evoke a visceral response to the history of the 
Holocaust. The intensity with which the horrors of the Nazi genocide are conveyed is then 
contrasted with the relief of the over-ground viewing platform which is angled towards the 
Houses of Parliament. The relief of exiting the museum space is associated with the realities 
of modern day democracy, thus giving visitors a renewed sense of pride in national political 
systems, and an appreciation for the values of twenty-first century society. The outcome of this 
negative epiphany is explicitly rooted in British national political needs, positioning today’s 
government as the antithesis of past traumatic events.  
In addition to this physical experience of the memorial, the positive presentation of 
present-day politics is also achieved through the repeated references to “British values” that 
apparently stem from the national response to Jewish suffering during the Holocaust. Despite 
the fact that this memorial site emphasises Britishness as opposed to an overarching European 
identity, the actual form of these values is largely the same in the plans for the UKHMLC as 
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those presented during the SIF and in subsequent IHRA work. Whilst British values include 
‘democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance of those with 
different faiths and beliefs’214, European values encompass ‘respect for human dignity and 
human rights, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law’.215 As opposed to implying 
that the UKHMLC is part of Europeanised Holocaust memory work in the twenty-first century, 
however, I argue that the creators of the UKHMLC are staking Britain’s claim to the assumed 
moral lessons of the Nazi genocide over other European countries. That is to say, Britain does 
not need to “learn” these values because they are already an inherent aspect of national identity, 
meaning that European nations must learn from the British example. This is a continuation of 
the portrayal of Britain as the heroes of Europe, reiterating national morality and rejecting the 
Europeanised narrative established by the Stockholm Declaration and the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
Section II Summary 
An analysis of British engagement with the Holocaust in the twenty-first century reveals not 
only that organisations and events continued to adhere to a positive national narrative after the 
SIF, but also that this positive political self-evaluation has become all the more explicit in light 
of the rejection of the EU signalled by the Brexit referendum. The significance of the Holocaust 
exhibition within the IWM as an institution dedicated to recording British wartime heroism 
and sacrifice has been addressed in detail by Lawson and, more recently, Jinks. Considering 
the ways in which the issues identified in 2004 have not only lingered, but have come to the 
forefront indicates a tendency to present the Holocaust in metaphysical terms even within 
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ostensibly pedagogical, historical organisations. This is not an inherent quality of representing 
the Holocaust, but seems to be a deliberate museological technique on the part of the IWM’s 
organisational bodies. There appears to be an attempt from the organisers of both HMD 2005 
and 2016 to present a more nuanced narrative of Britain’s wartime actions. However, the 
televised manifestations of the events in 2005 are inextricably tied to a presentation of Britain’s 
wartime actions in unambiguously positive terms. In the 2016 iteration of the event, the 
prioritisation of British values, in line with a broader scheme of policymaking, made this 
narrative all the more explicit. The presence of this nationally oriented memory approach not 
only affects an understanding of British Holocaust memory, but has broader implications for 
transnational readings of memory, affirming criticisms by scholars such as Allwork and Van 






















The overall intention of this thesis has been to show that a positive narrative of the Holocaust 
was established in 1945 that prevented a self-critical engagement with British actions during 
the Second World War throughout the twentieth century. This narrative has persisted in spite 
of the apparent transnationalisation of Holocaust memory since 2000, and, following the 
departure from the EU signalled by the Brexit Referendum, has been increasingly mobilised in 
the service of national political needs. As has been seen, at the end of the Second World War 
a political memory of the Holocaust that celebrated national heroism and elided negative 
actions on the part of the wartime government was established. One of the ways in which this 
memory was able to take root can be attributed to its mediation as an example of Landsberg’s 
prosthetic memory, prompting a visceral response in audiences and, thanks to its political 
inflection, limiting critical evaluations of the war. The impact of such a narrative can be 
identified well into the 1960s. As other countries saw the resurgence of Holocaust memory in 
the 1960s in connection to contemporary social and political issues, thus aligning it with 
Rothberg’s concept of multidirectional memory, the same could not occur in Britain. This is 
because the dominant narrative praised wartime political actions and had established British 
democracy as a bastion of moral values. This attitude continued to dominate understandings of 
the Holocaust in the 1980s, memorialisation efforts were viewed passively by the majority of 
the British public, and laid within the purview of the Anglo-Jewish community and specialist 
historians. Yet, by the 1990s, the Holocaust had become an area of particular political interest 
and concern. The transition of the Holocaust from a relatively insignificant social memory to 
a political memory can be understood in light of contemporary events, including the reshaping 
of Europe, contemporary genocides, and increasing global co-operation in Holocaust 
commemoration efforts. 
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 The awakening of a British Holocaust consciousness in line with global 
commemorative efforts has often been interpreted as a sign that the memory of the Holocaust 
itself has become cosmopolitan. According to this interpretation, a shared memory of the 
trauma of the Nazi genocide had become a unifying factor for European countries in the twenty-
first century. However, more recent analyses have called into question the popular 
interpretation of commemorative activity that took place at the start of the millennium as 
indicative of the consolidation of a transnational memory of the Holocaust. Instead, it has 
become apparent during the course of the twenty-first century that memory work has continued 
to align with specific national needs. By relating this to the British national context, I have been 
able to identify a continuation of the self-aggrandising narrative formed in 1945 within memory 
work that is ostensibly part of the transnational turn of Holocaust memory. The emphasis on 
British national needs has only heightened amid growing Euroscepticism and the rejection of 
the EU in British society and politics during the 2010s. Not only is there an implicit focus on 
the nation in today’s commemorative work, but I contend that this has become overt in recent 
years. In sum, British engagement with the Holocaust today explicitly serves national needs 
and rejects efforts to construct European identity around a shared understanding of the Nazi 
genocide carried out in the 2010s. 
Of course, Holocaust commemoration and memorialisation is never complete, and each 
generation must discover this past on its own terms. However, at this crucial stage as we begin 
to face the prospect of a world with no more living witnesses to the Holocaust, we seem to be 
at an important turning point. It is now not clear whether it will be possible to reverse the return 
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